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In Conley v. Gibson, the Supreme Court announced its commitment to a liberal
pleading regime in federal civil cases, and for decades thereafter was steadfast in
resisting ad hoc heightened pleading rules adopted by lower courts. Thus, from
1957 until a few years ago, most litigants could count on surviving a motion to
dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim so long as their pleading provided
some minimal notice to the defendant of the nature of their claim. Enter Ashcroft v.
Iqbal and Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly. Iqbal and Twombly, by many accounts,
two-stepped the Court from notice to heightened “plausibility” pleading for all
civil cases. And this shift garnered both applause and withering criticism. No one
seems willing to defend the process that the Court used to abandon fifty years of
pleading law—shorn as it was of any attention to the procedures contemplated by
the Rules Enabling Act—but as a substantive matter, heightened pleading has
many adherents. For its advocates, heightened pleading promises to reduce
crowded dockets, make discovery available only to worthy litigants, and generally
improve the quality of litigation to which attorneys and federal courts devote their
attention. And at the bottom of it all lies a fundamental assumption: notice
pleading lets in too many meritless cases, and heightened pleading will keep them
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out. Despite this assumption, however, there has been almost no empirical analysis
of the connection between merit and pleading.
This Article critically intervenes in this discussion by providing empirical data
to question the widespread assumptions about the costs and benefits of heightened
pleading. The data reported here show that pleadings that survive a notice
pleading standard but not a heightened pleading standard—what I refer to as
“thin” pleadings—are just as likely to be successful as those cases that would
survive heightened pleading. Indeed, the research summarized in this Article,
gathered through a novel retrospective analysis of appellate and trial court
decisions from 1990 to 1999, suggests that there is no correlation between the heft
of a pleading and the ultimate success of a case.
This Article certainly does not end the debate, but it is better to begin on solid
empirical footing than on supposition alone. Although there are limitations to the
data reported here, they can make an important contribution to the discussion, and
they serve to call attention to the costs of heightened pleading even as they suggest
avenues for further research. As Congress, the judiciary, and the academy are
engaged in a critical discussion as to how to respond to the Supreme Court’s most
recent alteration of pleading jurisprudence, relevant empirical data should be part
of the conversation.
INTRODUCTION
Not for the first time, pleading is at a critical crossroads, being the subject of
vigorous debate in the judiciary, the legislature, and the academy. The Supreme
Court’s decisions in two recent cases, Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly1 and
Ashcroft v. Iqbal,2 are the most obvious prompts for the renewed discussion. In
Twombly, the Supreme Court adopted a “plausibility” pleading standard in
reviewing the sufficiency of an antitrust complaint, overruling in part Conley v.
Gibson,3 the 1957 case that ratified the “notice” pleading regime adopted by the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.4 Iqbal extended Twombly to all civil actions
and applied an even more rigorous standard to a civil rights action filed against
high-level federal officials.5 The end result is a pleading standard that heightens
attention to “conclusory” pleading,6 treats state of mind allegations in a manner
at odds with prior precedent,7 and encourages lower courts to apply their own

1. 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
2. 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009).
3. 355 U.S. 41 (1957).
4. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 560–63 (reviewing criticisms of Conley and concluding that
expansive language of the case “has been questioned, criticized, and explained away long
enough”).
5. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950 (explaining that in determining whether a complaint is
“plausible,” judges may rely on their “judicial experience and common sense”).
6. Id. at 1949–50 (stating that “conclusory” allegations are those that simply mirror the
requirements of a cause of action).
7. Id. at 1954 (interpreting Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b) to require more than
“general” allegations for state of mind even where neither fraud nor mistake is alleged). The
Iqbal Court’s interpretation of Rule 9(b) is arguably at odds with the Advisory Committee
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intuitions8 to decide whether a plaintiff’s9 legal claims and allegations are
sufficient to proceed to discovery.10
The shift from Conley to Iqbal/Twombly pleading has created controversy and
confusion throughout the legal world, both as to whether the recent decisions are
meaningfully different from past practice and as to whether anything should be
done in response. The debate about just how much of pleading law was changed by
Iqbal and Twombly is perhaps most active within the judiciary.11 And for those
Note to Rule 9. See FED. R. CIV. P. 9 advisory committee’s note (citing ENGLISH RULES
UNDER THE JUDICATURE ACT (The Annual Practice, 1937) O. 19, r. 22). The English rules
cited by Rule 9 state that when a plaintiff makes allegations as to any “condition of the mind
of any person, it shall be sufficient to allege the same as a fact without setting out the
circumstances from which the same is to be inferred.” Jeff Sovern, Reconsidering Federal
Civil Rule 9(b): Do We Need Particularized Pleading Requirements in Fraud Cases?, 104
F.R.D. 143, 146 n.19 (1985). Moreover, as some courts have recognized, the Iqbal Court’s
treatment of Rule 9(b) is in some tension with its prior decision in Swierkiewicz v. Sorema
N.A., 534 U.S. 506 (2002). See, e.g., Fowler v. Univ. of Pittsburgh Med. Ctr. Shadyside, 578
F.3d 203, 210–11 (3d Cir. 2009); Brown v. Castleton State Coll., 663 F. Supp. 2d 392, 403
n.8 (D. Vt. 2009); see also Kasten v. Ford Motor Co., No. 09-11754, 2009 WL 3628012, at
*7 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 30, 2009) (stating that tension between Swierkiewicz and Iqbal has yet
to be resolved).
8. See Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950 (advising courts to rely on their “judicial experience
and common sense” to determine the plausibility of a claim).
9. Pleading standards obviously apply to all parties. Defendants sometimes bring
counter-, cross-, or third-party claims, and as such may face the burden of overcoming
heightened pleading standards. Indeed, many courts have applied the Iqbal standard to strike
affirmative defenses included by defendants in their answers. See, e.g., Francisco v. Verizon
S., Inc., No. 3:09CV737, 2010 WL 2990159, at *6 n.3 (E.D. Va. July 29, 2010) (collecting
cases). But in this paper I will use “plaintiff” to refer generally to anyone who brings a claim
that is subject to a particular pleading standard.
10. See Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950.
11. Compare, e.g., Smith v. Duffey, 576 F.3d 336, 340 (7th Cir. 2009) (panel decision
by Posner, J.) (describing Iqbal as “special in its own way” and suggesting that it should be
limited to cases in which there are concerns about the burdens of discovery), with Fowler,
578 F.3d at 210–11 (emphasizing breadth of Iqbal and suggesting that it overruled sub
silentio Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 506). To be fair, the Supreme Court itself stated that it did
not consider Twombly or Iqbal to break significant new ground, see Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at
1949–50; Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 563 n.8 (2007), and some lower courts
seem to be taking the Court at its word. See, e.g., Valenti v. Massapequa Union Free Sch.
Dist., No. 09-CV-977, 2010 WL 475203, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 5, 2010); Rouse v. Berry, 680
F. Supp. 2d 233, 236 (D.D.C. 2010); Desrouleaux v. Quest Diagnostics, Inc., No. 09-61672CIV, 2009 WL 5214964 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 29, 2009); Gillman v. Inner City Broad. Corp., No.
08 Civ. 8909, 2009 WL 3003244, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 18, 2009). The dissenters in Iqbal
took a sharply different view, see Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1959–61 (Souter, J., dissenting), and
many lower courts have explicitly acknowledged the significant difference between
adjudicating pleading motions before and after these decisions. See Young v. City of Visalia,
687 F. Supp. 2d 1141, 1144–46, 1149 (E.D. Cal. 2009) (interpreting Iqbal to overturn Ninth
Circuit pleading precedent for constitutional claims against municipalities); Doe v. Butte
Valley Unified Sch. Dist., No. CIV. 09-245, 2009 WL 2424608, at *8 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 6,
2009) (questioning whether, after Iqbal, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure form
complaints are still sufficient); Ocasio-Hernandez v. Fortuno-Burset, 639 F. Supp. 2d 217,
226 n.4 (D.P.R. 2009) (acknowledging Iqbal’s harsh results); Ibrahim v. Dep’t of Homeland
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within the judicial branch who interpret the decisions as marking a significant
change in pleading standards, there is the question of just what to do about it.12
Meanwhile, some members of both the House and Senate have determined that
Iqbal and Twombly were momentous and must be overruled legislatively.13 Finally,
there is close to a consensus14 among academic observers that the Iqbal/Twombly
pleading standard marks a sharp break with the past, a welcome change to some15
Sec., No. C 06-00545, 2009 WL 2246194, at *10 (N.D. Cal. July 27, 2009) (criticizing the
demanding nature of Iqbal standard); Williams v. City of Cleveland, No. 1:09 CV 1310,
2009 WL 2151778, at *4 (N.D. Ohio July 16, 2009) (describing Iqbal as imposing a
heightened pleading standard); Kyle v. Holinka, No. 09-CV-90, 2009 WL 1867671, at *1
(W.D. Wis. June 29, 2009) (describing Iqbal as “implicitly overturn[ing] decades of circuit
precedent in which the court of appeals had allowed discrimination claims to be pleaded in a
conclusory fashion”).
12. The Judicial Conference Advisory Committee on Civil Rules made Iqbal a central
point of discussion for its May 2010 Civil Litigation Conference at Duke Law School. Press
Release, Federal Judiciary, May Conference to Be First of Its Kind to Look at Civil
Litigation in Federal Courts (Apr. 12, 2010), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/
News/NewsView/10-04-12/May_Conference_to_Be_First_of_Its_Kind_to_Look_at_Civil_
Litigation_in_Federal_Courts.aspx. And the Civil Rules Advisory Committee, while it
considers the ramifications of the Supreme Court’s recent shift in pleadings jurisprudence,
has been keeping diligent track of the lower court cases citing Iqbal and Twombly, as well as
the dismissal rates pre- and post-Iqbal and Twombly. See Memorandum from Andrea
Kuperman to Civil Rules Committee (July 26, 2010), available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Iqbal_memo_072610.pdf;
Statistics Div., Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts, Motions to Dismiss, FED. RULEMAKING,
U.S.
COURTS,
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Motions_to_
Dismiss_081210.pdf (last modified Sept. 17, 2010).
13. See Open Access to Courts Act of 2009, H.R. 4115, 111th Cong. § 2 (2009); Notice
Pleading Restoration Act of 2009, S. 1504, 111th Cong. § 2 (2009). These bills seek to
ensure that pre-Twombly pleading rules govern Rule 8 standards.
14. At least one respected commentator has suggested that Iqbal and Twombly are not
necessarily as consequential as most academics seem to believe. Edward A. Hartnett,
Taming Twombly, Even After Iqbal, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 473 (2010) (arguing for limited
reading of Twombly and Iqbal).
15. Those who support the rule applied in Iqbal and Twombly offer a variety of
justifications. See Andrew Blair-Stanek, Twombly Is the Logical Extension of the Mathews
v. Eldridge Test to Discovery, 62 FLA. L. REV. 1 (2010) (arguing that the plausibility
standard is a natural extension of procedural due process jurisprudence); Scott Dodson,
Comparative Convergences in Pleading Standards, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 441 (2010) (arguing
that Iqbal and Twombly conform to the pleading standards in practice outside the United
States); Max Huffman, The Necessity of Pleading Elements in Private Antitrust Conspiracy
Claims, 10 U. PA. J. BUS. & EMP. L. 627, 641–43 (2008) (defending Twombly on notice
grounds, the high costs of discovery, and concern over permitting “false positives” to
proceed past the pleading stage); Keith N. Hylton, When Should a Case Be Dismissed? The
Economics of Pleading and Summary Judgment Standards, 16 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 39, 50–
53 (2008) (constructing an economic model to suggest that pleading standards are useful
mediators of merit and defending Twombly under this framework); Sheldon Nahmod,
Constitutional Torts, Over-Deterrence and Supervisory Liability After Iqbal, 14 LEWIS &
CLARK L. REV. 279, 303–05 (2010) (suggesting that Iqbal is a useful bar to certain
constitutional claims); Douglas G. Smith, The Evolution of a New Pleading Standard:
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 88 OR. L. REV. (forthcoming 2010), available at
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and lamentable to others.16 Particular attention has been paid to the impact of the
Iqbal and Twombly rules on civil rights litigation, where informational asymmetry
is often at its highest point but where federal courts and federal law have played an
important historical role in developing and adjudicating substantive rights.17
There are many purposes of litigation: compensating victims of wrongful
conduct, deterring misconduct, enforcing important social norms, and eliminating
the need for recourse to violent self-help, to name a few. In the United States, we
generally rely on private parties to fulfill these goals with the assistance of a
judicial infrastructure.18 Pleading rules play a special filtering, or “gatekeeping,”
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1463844 (maintaining that Iqbal will help to screen meritless cases
that would otherwise settle because of discovery costs); see also Richard A. Epstein, Bell
Atlantic v. Twombly: How Motions to Dismiss Become (Disguised) Summary Judgments, 25
WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 61, 98–99 (2007) (defending Twombly to the extent that it is limited
to a small subset of cases where there is heightened concern for weak or frivolous cases).
But see Stephen B. Burbank, Pleading and the Dilemmas of “General Rules,” 2009 WIS. L.
REV. 535, 558 (suggesting that a court concerned with the particular defense of qualified
immunity has the power to impose fact pleading as a matter of substantive federal law, but
arguing against it).
16. Critics of Iqbal and Twombly, like supporters, approach the cases from many
different perspectives. See Robert G. Bone, Plausibility Pleading Revisited and Revised: A
Comment on Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 849 (2010) (maintaining that Iqbal
has extended the plausibility analysis of Twombly in a dangerous direction); Edward D.
Cavanagh, Twombly, The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Courts, 82 ST. JOHN’S
L. REV. 877, 879 (2008) (criticizing the change in pleading as a matter of process and
questioning the Court’s assumption that lower courts and parties cannot manage discovery
costs); Kevin M. Clermont & Stephen C. Yeazell, Inventing Tests, Destabilizing Systems, 95
IOWA L. REV. 821 (2010) (suggesting that both cases be reconsidered because of their
destabilizing effect and their inconsistency with the process of amending the Federal Rules);
Kevin M. Clermont, Litigation Realities Redux, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1919, 1932–34
(2009) (stating that in Twombly, the Court acted “with no empirical support that a problem
existed, and with no exploration of the dimensions of that problem or the efficacy of the
Court’s newfangled cure”); Kenneth S. Klein, Ashcroft v. Iqbal Crashes Rule 8 Pleading
Standards on to Unconstitutional Shores, 88 NEB. L. REV. 261, 262 (2009) (suggesting that
Iqbal’s pleading rule violates the Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial); Elizabeth M.
Schneider, The Changing Shape of Federal Civil Pretrial Practice: The Disparate Impact on
Civil Rights and Employment Discrimination Cases, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 517 (2010)
(detailing the burden that the new pleading standard will impose on civil rights and
employment discrimination plaintiffs); A. Benjamin Spencer, Plausibility Pleading, 49 B.C.
L. REV. 431, 460–86 (2008) (criticizing Twombly on numerous grounds, including for
imposing a standard that would screen out meritorious as well as meritless claims); Suja A.
Thomas, The New Summary Judgment Motion: The Motion to Dismiss Under Iqbal and
Twombly, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 15 (2010) (arguing that the cases move the summary
judgment inquiry to the pleading stage).
17. See Suzette M. Malveaux, Front Loading and Heavy Lifting: How Pre-Dismissal
Discovery Can Address the Detrimental Effect of Iqbal on Civil Rights Cases, 14 LEWIS &
CLARK L. REV. 65, 85–101 (2010) (detailing the potential impact of Iqbal on civil rights
cases); Howard M. Wasserman, Iqbal, Procedural Mismatches, and Civil Rights Litigation,
14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 157, 166–69 (2010) (describing tension between liberal pleading
rules and the burdens imposed by substantive civil rights law).
18. In 2007, state courts received about eighteen million civil filings, an increase of
about 800,000 cases from 2006. NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, EXAMINING THE WORK OF
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role in this context.19 From this gatekeeping perspective, one can imagine many
justifications for heightening pleading standards—the high costs of discovery20 and
the desire to reduce heavy caseloads,21 among others—but a fundamental
assumption made by those who support stricter pleading standards is that merit
correlates with the factual detail offered by a claimant.22 On this account, the ease
STATE COURTS: AN ANALYSIS OF 2007 STATE COURT CASELOADS 1 (2009). Financial
disputes over money (primarily contract and small claims cases) comprised about 70% of the
civil caseload in state courts. Id. In seven representative states, about 6% of civil filings were
tort actions and 16% were probate filings. Id. at 2. It is fair to conclude that the vast majority
of the work of state courts involves resolution of disputes between private parties on both
sides of the litigation. Cases filed in federal court are much more likely to involve
government parties either as plaintiffs or defendants, although federal filings are miniscule
compared to state court filings. For instance, out of 276,937 civil cases filed in United States
District Courts between October 2008 and September 2009, perhaps half may have involved
government parties: 8,834 cases in which the United States was a plaintiff; 34,310 cases in
which the United States was a defendant; 273 cases that involved a challenge to the
constitutionality of a state statute; 41,000 cases that involved petitions by state prisoners; and
about 34,000 cases classified as civil rights, some portion of which might involve state
defendants. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, 2009 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR:
JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS 141–43 tbl.C-2 (2010), available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/Statistics/JudicialBusiness/JudicialBusiness.
aspx?doc=/uscourts/Statistics/JudicialBusiness/2009/JudicialBusinespdfversion.pdf.
19. Commentators now commonly characterize pleading, like summary judgment or
Daubert determinations, as having a “gatekeeping” function. See Clermont, supra note 16, at
1932; Lonny S. Hoffman, Burn Up the Chaff with Unquenchable Fire: What Two Doctrinal
Intersections Can Teach Us About Judicial Power over Pleadings, 88 B.U. L. Rev. 1217,
1224 (2008); Schneider, supra note 16, at 527; Emily Sherwin, The Jurisprudence of
Pleading: Rights, Rules, and Conley v. Gibson, 52 HOW. L.J. 73, 94 (2008).
20. See Epstein, supra note 15, at 68–72; Douglas G. Smith, The Twombly Revolution?,
36 PEPP. L. REV. 1063, 1094–95 (2009) (framing heightened pleading as a necessary balance
to the high costs of discovery). But see John P. Sullivan, Twombly and Iqbal: The Latest
Retreat from Notice Pleading, 43 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1, 61 (2009) (criticizing the discovery
abuse justification).
21. See Christopher M. Fairman, The Myth of Notice Pleading, 45 ARIZ. L. REV. 987,
1060 (2003).
22. The Twombly Court made clear that, precisely because of the high costs of
discovery in antitrust actions, it made sense to weed out “anemic” cases through pleading
rules rather than other case management devices. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,
559–60 (2007). And in Iqbal, the Court was unwilling to “unlock the doors of discovery” to
plaintiffs who had “nothing more than conclusions” to verify the merit of their claim.
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1950 (2009). By contrast, the notice pleading standard
articulated in Conley was famously agnostic on the ultimate merit of any particular claim.
See Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45–47 (1957) (asking whether a claim would lie if
allegations were proven and rejecting the argument that a complaint requires factual detail);
see also Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989) (“Rule 12(b)(6) does not
countenance . . . dismissals based on a judge’s disbelief of a complaint’s factual
allegations.”). Indeed, to the extent that Congress has relied on heightened pleading in
particular kinds of cases, such as securities fraud cases, it has based that reliance on the
assumption that heightened pleading standards can reduce meritless cases without deterring
valid ones. See Stephen J. Choi, Do the Merits Matter Less After the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act?, 23 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 598, 600 (2007) (concluding that despite
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of notice pleading combined with the high costs of discovery and litigation forces
defendants to settle meritless lawsuits rather than defend against them to the hilt in
court.23 Even a few critics of the Iqbal/Twombly heightened pleading standard tend
to assume that there is a rational motivation for raising pleading standards, in order
to better filter out meritless suits, even if they disagree with it for other reasons.24
There is, however, no empirical basis supporting the assumption that heightened
pleading standards—either the plausibility standard ushered in by Iqbal and
Twombly or the closely related “fact pleading” standard25 that has always lurked as
a competitor to notice pleading—are more efficient filters than Conley’s notice
pleading standard. Other than in the specific area of securities fraud litigation,26
there has been no empirical inquiry into the connection between what I will
(without any claim to originality27) refer to as “thin” pleading and the ultimate

Congress’s intent the PSLRA likely deterred the filing of a substantial number of
meritorious cases). Nonetheless, the academic commentary regarding Iqbal and Twombly
has routinely accepted the assumption that heightened pleading will mostly work to filter out
meritless cases, not prematurely terminate valid ones. See Blair-Stanek, supra note 15, at
22–23 (maintaining that plaintiff’s interest in cases like Twombly is minimal because it is
unlikely plaintiff has a valid claim); Dodson, supra note 15, at 465 (citing efficiency goals as
one justification for fact pleading); Geoffrey P. Miller, Preliminary Judgments, 2010 U. ILL.
L. REV. 165, 167 (listing heightened pleading as one approach for filtering “weak or
frivolous cases”); Smith, supra note 20, at 1067; Paul Stancil, Balancing the Pleading
Equation, 61 BAYLOR L. REV. 90, 169 (2009) (suggesting that for certain kinds of cases
heightened pleading can “reduce the cost disparities that can sometimes induce plaintiffs to
file frivolous claims”).
23. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 560 (cost of discovery); Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544
U.S. 336, 347 (2005) (expressing concern over abuse of discovery); Fairman, supra note 21,
at 1059–60 (describing concern with frivolous cases imposing burdensome discovery as a
principal judicial justification for heightened pleading); Richard L. Marcus, The Revival of
Fact Pleading Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 433, 436
(1986) (suggesting that heightened pleading is a response to litigation pressure and that there
is a limited but valid place for using pleading to address the merits of particular kinds of
litigation). Even those who are critics of Iqbal’s extension of Twombly are swayed, in part,
by the idea that heightened pleading may be good medicine for certain kinds of cases. See
Robert G. Bone, Twombly, Pleading Rules, and the Regulation of Court Access, 94 IOWA L.
REV. 873 (2009) (arguing that there are some normative arguments in favor of limiting thin
pleading, but adoption of rules that depart from notice pleading should be consistent with the
statutory or rulemaking process and should be carefully tailored based on particular
categories of cases).
24. See, e.g., Epstein, supra note 15, at 98–99 (arguing for a limited role of the Twombly
pleading standard, where there is heightened concern for weak or frivolous cases); Marcus,
supra note 23, at 436; A. Benjamin Spencer, Understanding Pleading Doctrine, 108 MICH.
L. REV. 1, 18, 22 (2009) (acknowledging that the plausibility standard, “at least as stated,”
vindicates the efficiency interest in screening out cases based on their likelihood of merit).
As Spencer recognizes, however, there are other interests at stake in pleading, and
plausibility pleading risks undermining those other interests. Spencer, supra, at 24–25.
25. See Marcus, supra note 23, at 444–51 (describing the revival of “fact pleading”).
26. See Choi, supra note 22.
27. See Herbert A. Eastman, Speaking Truth to Power: The Language of Civil Rights
Litigators, 104 YALE L.J. 763, 795 (1995) (questioning, from the perspective of client
representation and narrative, use of “thin” pleadings in civil rights cases).
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merit of a particular case.28 The existence of groundless assumptions which come
to frame perceptions of litigation is nothing new,29 but in the context of a pleading
standard it is extremely consequential. This Article seeks to begin to fill this gap by
exploring the operating assumptions about the role of pleading in civil litigation.
The data reported here suggest that the common wisdom among supporters of
heightened pleading along the lines of Iqbal and Twombly cannot be supported
empirically. Rules that subject thin pleadings to greater scrutiny and dismissal do
not do a better job than notice pleading of filtering out meritless claims. In the
absence of empirical evidence that contradicts the conclusions reached here, the
recent move towards adoption of a plausibility pleading standard in all civil
litigation bears further scrutiny.
I emphasize the limited nature of these data because the empirical inquiry is
quite complex. After all, cases that are dismissed under a heightened pleading
regime cannot generally be followed to determine their ultimate merit: they have
been dismissed and are therefore, absent amendment, lost to follow-up.30 Thus, I
estimate the cost of heightened pleading standards through a novel empirical
approach. By focusing on cases decided during a recent ten-year period (1990–
1999) in which the Conley notice pleading standard was ostensibly good law,31 I
attempt to estimate the ultimate success of thinly pleaded cases. And by comparing
this rate of success to the entire set of litigated cases over the same time period, I
conclude that thinly pleaded cases are at least as successful as the generality of
cases. Furthermore, for some types of cases, most surprisingly civil rights cases,
thinly pleaded cases may achieve an even higher level of success than similar
actions supported by more detailed or convincing pleadings.
I also emphasize the somewhat narrow framework of the empirical project. The
costs and benefits of litigation go beyond measurements of success. There may be
significant costs to prematurely dismissing cases that will ultimately prove
unsuccessful: some of these lawsuits provide important information to the public
about disputed governmental and corporate conduct; some lack “merit” because of
remedial limitations like qualified immunity or a statute of limitations, and not
because of a lack of a legally cognizable harm. There also may be benefits to
prematurely dismissing cases that will ultimately prove meritorious: some lawsuits
will drain a significant amount of collective resources for sparse individual gain,
through discovery costs and court time, for instance. But, given the empirical

28. See Clermont, supra note 16, at 1930–31 (observing that despite the longstanding
controversy over pleading, there are no empirical studies “whatsoever on the virtues of case
exposition through pleading”); see also Richard L. Marcus, The Puzzling Persistence of
Pleading Practice, 76 TEX. L. REV. 1749, 1754, 1759–61 (1998) (finding a dearth of
evidence related to the ultimate resolution of 12(b)(6) dismissals on appeal).
29. E.g., Kevin M. Clermont & Stewart J. Schwab, How Employment Discrimination
Plaintiffs Fare in Federal Court, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 429, 431, 453–56 (2004)
(referring to debates about employment discrimination litigation).
30. Spencer, supra note 24, at 24 (“[I]t is unknowable whether a dismissed claim was
nonetheless meritorious in an absolute sense.”).
31. As discussed below, even before Iqbal and Twombly, lower courts did not always
hew to the most expansive reading of Conley. See infra notes 49–53 and accompanying text.
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assumption that undergirds much of the support for heightened pleading standards,
some empirical inquiry is appropriate.
This Article proceeds in four Parts. Part I identifies the problem by reviewing
the history of notice pleading in the United States, the development of alternative
models of pleading, and the Supreme Court’s vacillation between traditional notice
pleading and heightened pleading.32 Despite the important stakes and policy
considerations in play, these debates have taken place without any consideration of
empirical evidence. Part II describes the methodology of the study reported here.
The paper uses a retrospective review of cases decided over the course of ten years,
1990 to 1999, to isolate those cases that most likely would be vulnerable to
dismissal under the Iqbal and Twombly pleading standard. After identifying these
100-odd cases, I followed them to determine whether they achieved a successful
resolution for the claimant. Part III reports and analyzes the data. In brief, the cases
identified achieved significant success—more than half of the cases followed
through the study resulted in a settlement or a plaintiff’s verdict. The level of
success in the thinly pleaded cohort compares favorably to general success rates
obtained from data provided by the Administrative Office of the United States
Courts (“Administrative Office”) and from independent research conducted by
other scholars. This research suggests that thin pleading does not correlate with
lack of merit. This conclusion is buttressed when one disaggregates the cases by
type of litigation (civil rights, contracts, antitrust, etc.). Part IV considers the
ramifications of these data and alternative explanations for the outcomes reported
here, including various selection biases that could flow from the methodology. The
bottom-line conclusion is that, to the extent advocates for heightened pleading
believe that stricter pleading will be a better filter for merit than notice pleading,
that assumption should be questioned. In the midst of the heated debate about the
costs that notice pleading imposes upon defendants, this Article draws attention to
the substantial costs imposed by heightened pleading standards on plaintiffs with
meritorious claims.
I. THE (RE)EMERGENCE OF HEIGHTENED PLEADING STANDARDS
The changes ushered in by the 1938 adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure are hard to overstate. The Rules’ effect on pleading was particularly
striking. Prior to the adoption of the Federal Rules, pleading was claim-specific and
required adherence to technicalities that the drafters of the Rules sought to

32. As Kevin Clermont and Stephen Yeazell have observed, there is a marked
difference, at least philosophically if not practically, between the plausibility pleading
standard adopted by the Court in Twombly and Iqbal and the heightened fact pleading
regime which was often trotted out as an alternative to Conley’s notice pleading regime in
the 1990s. See Clermont & Yeazell, supra note 16, at 832–33. These differences are not
material, however, to the data reported here, because both plausibility and detailed fact
pleading regimes would operate to make thinly pleaded complaints more likely to be
dismissed. See id. at 833 (“Because plausibility requires the plaintiff to plead particularized
facts and maybe even some evidence, the federal pleading product will usually not look
much different from a complaint in a heightened-fact-pleading regime.”).
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eradicate.33 Rule 8, with its mandate that all a pleading requires is a “short and
plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,”34 was a
sharp departure from prior practice.35 As has been recounted by numerous
commentators, the transition from common law rules of pleading, to code pleading,
to the notice pleading ushered in by the Federal Rules, represented a gradual but
significant policy choice marked by reliance on discovery and trial to determine
merit rather than technical rules of pleading.36
This change was crystallized by the Supreme Court’s decision in Conley v.
Gibson,37 in which the Court articulated an interpretation of Rule 8 that focused on
the notice given to the defendant of the nature of the plaintiff’s lawsuit rather than
on the relationship of particular pleaded facts to the legal claims at issue. The
Court’s language, which would come to dominate pleading inquiries for several
decades, treated pleading as a way of “facilitat[ing] a proper decision on the
merits”38 by giving a defendant “fair notice of what the plaintiff’s claim is and the
grounds upon which it rests.”39 Although there are interesting and worthwhile
debates about the extent to which Conley emerged from a debate about legal
sufficiency of a complaint versus factual sufficiency of a complaint, lower courts
and the Supreme Court consistently interpreted Conley as establishing a minimum
factual threshold for complaints, rather than requiring complaints to conform to
specific dictates of positive law.40
Conley was a strange poster child for notice pleading—the plaintiffs had
provided extensive factual detail, they had specified their legal claims, and neither
party had briefed or addressed Rule 8, although the respondents did make reference
to the “vague” allegations in the complaint.41 Indeed, the comments made to drafts
of Justice Black’s opinion for a unanimous Court were minimal, and only Justices
Harlan and Brennan seemed to be at all focused on the portion of the opinion that
discussed the applicable pleading standard.42 Thus, the Supreme Court’s broad

33. See Marcus, supra note 23, at 438–40.
34. FED. R. CIV. P. 8.
35. The goal of the Federal Rules was to create both simplicity and uniformity in
pleading and to prevent premature dismissals. See Marcus, supra note 23, at 439 (“Rule
8(a)(2) was drafted carefully to avoid use of the charged phrases ‘fact,’ ‘conclusion,’ and
‘cause of action.’”).
36. E.g., Fairman, supra note 21, at 990–91; see also Sherwin, supra note 19, at 76–77
(summarizing history of pleading standards and functions from medieval origins onward).
For an overall history of the Federal Rules, see generally Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity
Conquered Common Law: The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in Historical Perspective,
135 U. PA. L. REV. 909 (1987).
37. 355 U.S. 41 (1957).
38. Id. at 48.
39. Id. at 47.
40. See Sherwin, supra note 19, at 78–83 (framing the issue as a debate between Legal
Realists and legal formalists).
41. Brief for Respondents Pat J. Gibson, et. al. at 26, Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41
(1957) (No. 7), 1957 WL 87662, at *26; see Sherwin, supra note 19, at 89–90; see also
Petitioner’s Brief, Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957) (No. 7), 1957 WL 87661.
42. See Memorandum from Justice John M. Harlan to Justice Hugo Black (Nov. 13,
1957) (on file with the author and available from the Collections of the Manuscript Division,
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statement that a complaint should survive dismissal “unless it appears beyond
doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts . . . which would entitle him to
relief,”43 resolved a heavily disputed issue relating to the meaning of Rule 8
without significant input from the parties or other interested observers. But once so
articulated, the notice pleading standard dominated the resolution of pre-discovery
motions, at least rhetorically.44 Until Iqbal and Twombly, the Supreme Court had
maintained a relatively consistent commitment to Conley’s notice pleading rule,
twice unanimously rejecting heightened pleading standards in civil rights and
employment discrimination cases.45 Admonishing lower courts to adhere to
Conley’s liberal pleading standard, the Court specifically recognized that the
purported justification for heightened pleading standards was to screen out
unmeritorious suits.46 The Court even acknowledged that there might be “practical
merits” to heightened fact pleading,47 but reminded the lower courts that such
changes may be obtained only “‘by the process of amending the Federal Rules,’”
not by judicial fiat.48
Thus, one story to tell about the transition from Conley to Iqbal and Twombly is
that of a Court which only recently lost faith in a notice pleading standard, perhaps
as a result of judgments about the practicalities of modern litigation. But the
Court’s embrace of notice pleading was not unwavering, as evidenced by its
flirtation with heightened pleading well before Iqbal and Twombly. In 1983, for
instance, the Court dropped a footnote in an antitrust case, Associated General

Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.); Memorandum from Justice William J. Brennan to
Justice Hugo Black (Nov. 15, 1957) (on file with the author and available from the
Collections of the Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.). As a result
of these suggestions, it appears that the following sentence was deleted from the penultimate
paragraph of the decision: “Under the Rules the best cause, not the cleverest pleader, is to
prevail.” See Printed and Circulated Draft Opinion (1st) at 7, Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41
(1957) (circulated Nov. 13, 1957) (on file with the author and available from the Collections
of the Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.). The aspect of the draft
that highlighted the minimum requirements imposed by Rule 8 was retained, however. See
Conley, 355 U.S. at 47.
43. Conley, 355 U.S. at 45–46.
44. Christopher Fairman has argued that notice pleading has rarely been the rule, at least
in practice, pointing to examples from antitrust, RICO, environmental, civil rights,
intellectual property, and defamation cases, among others, in which lower courts have
constructed a variety of heightened pleading standards. See Fairman, supra note 21, at 998–
1011 (summarizing different categories of heightened pleading).
45. See Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 512–13 (2002) (explaining that
discovery and summary judgment, not heightened pleading requirements, are the proper
means for disposal of unmeritorious suits); Leatherman v. Tarrant Cnty. Narcotics
Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168 (1993) (stating that the heightened
pleading standard for § 1983 claims against municipalities is “impossible to square . . . with
the liberal system of ‘notice pleading’ set up by the Federal Rules”); see also Crawford-El v.
Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 595 (1998) (“[O]ur cases demonstrate that questions regarding
pleading, discovery, and summary judgment are most frequently and most effectively
resolved either by the rulemaking process or the legislative process.”).
46. Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 514–15; Leatherman, 507 U.S. at 168.
47. Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 515.
48. Id. (quoting Leatherman, 507 U.S. at 168).
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Contractors of California, Inc. v. California State Council of Carpenters,49 that
some lower courts took to invite a heightened pleading standard for certain aspects
of antitrust claims.50 And in Siegert v. Gilley,51 Justice Kennedy suggested that
heightened pleading standards may be an appropriate judicial tool for
accommodating the qualified immunity defense, available to government officials
sued for damages.52 Given the Court’s own seeming ambivalence about Conley—at
least in particular categories of cases like antitrust and civil rights—one can better
understand lower courts’ willingness to announce temporary departures from a pure
notice pleading standard.53
Any such ambivalence seems to have evaporated with the Court’s
announcement of its decisions in Iqbal and Twombly. In the former, the Court
adopted a “plausibility” standard in an antitrust case, expressing its concern,
specifically in the antitrust context, that liberal pleading rules, combined with
expansive discovery, would pressure defendants to settle weak or meritless cases.54
Twombly also overruled at least the portion of Conley that cautioned district courts
not to dismiss a case for insufficient pleading unless the court can conclude that
“the plaintiff can prove no set of facts” consistent with the defendant’s liability.55
The Court’s decision in Iqbal closed a theoretical door, left open in Twombly, by
making it clear that plausibility pleading applied in all civil cases, not just antitrust
claims.56 Iqbal also articulated a two-step process for evaluating the sufficiency of

49. 459 U.S. 519, 528 n.17 (1983).
50. Fairman, supra note 21, at 1013–14; see id. at 1013–14 nn.173–78.
51. 500 U.S. 226 (1991).
52. Id. at 235–36 (Kennedy, J., concurring); see also Fairman, supra note 21, at 997 &
nn.79–81 (summarizing aspects of the Court’s jurisprudence in which commitment to notice
pleading wavered).
53. At various times, some circuit courts adopted heightened pleading standards in civil
rights cases. E.g., Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 679 (9th Cir. 2001);
Breidenbach v. Bolish, 126 F.3d 1288 (10th Cir. 1997); Veney v. Hogan, 70 F.3d 917 (6th
Cir. 1995); Kartseva v. Dep’t of State, 37 F.3d 1524 (D.C. Cir. 1994); Babb v. Dorman, 33
F.3d 472 (5th Cir. 1994); Williams v. Ala. State Univ., 865 F. Supp. 789 (M.D. Ala. 1994),
rev’d on other grounds, 102 F.3d 1179 (11th Cir. 1997). By the time that Twombly was
announced, however, most circuit courts had recognized that their heightened pleading
standards could not survive the Supreme Court’s decisions in Leatherman, Crawford-El, and
Swierkiewicz. E.g., Johnson v. Johnson, 385 F.3d 503, 529 (5th Cir. 2004) (noting that the
Fifth Circuit’s heightened pleading standard for qualified immunity cases had been
overruled in 1995); Galbraith v. Cnty. of Santa Clara, 307 F.3d 1119, 1121 (9th Cir. 2002)
(overruling cases which applied heightened pleading standard to civil rights claims); Goad v.
Mitchell, 297 F.3d 497, 502 (6th Cir. 2002) (overruling Veney in light of Crawford-El);
Currier v. Doran, 242 F.3d 905, 916 (10th Cir. 2001) (overruling Breidenbach in light of
Crawford-El); Kimberlin v. Quinlan, 199 F.3d 496, 499 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (noting that
Crawford-El rejected the D.C. Circuit’s heightened pleading standard). But see Dalrymple v.
Reno, 334 F.3d 991, 996 (11th Cir. 2003) (continuing to apply heightened pleading to civil
rights claims). Ironically, the Eleventh Circuit has interpreted Iqbal to reject a heightened
pleading standard for civil rights claims. Randall v. Scott, 610 F.3d 701, 710 (11th Cir.
2010).
54. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 559–60 (2007).
55. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45–46 (1957); Twombly, 550 U.S. at 561–63.
56. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949–50 (2009).
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a complaint.57 First, courts must review each allegation in a complaint and exclude
from consideration those allegations that are stated in a “conclusory” fashion.58 In
and of itself, this was not new; what was new was the Court’s holding that
allegations of state of mind, despite the explicit language of Rule 9(b),59 must be
alleged with some factual detail.60 The second step, the plausibility analysis,
assesses the fit between the nonconclusory facts alleged and the relief claimed.61
Iqbal made it clear that the judge’s role in plausibility analysis was one that called
for the exercise of “judicial experience and common sense,”62 a surprising turn
from the judicial role contemplated in Conley.63
In both Iqbal and Twombly the Court disclaimed any intent to adopt a
heightened fact pleading standard,64 and lower courts are confused as to the precise
ramifications of the cases.65 This confusion does not lessen the need to evaluate the

57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Under Rule 9(b), “conditions of a person’s mind may be alleged generally.” FED. R.
CIV. P. 9(b).
60. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949–50.
61. Id. at 1950.
62. Id.
63. See Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47–48 (1957).
64. See Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1937; Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
65. For example, there is a broad dispute over whether “general” allegations of state of
mind are sufficient on their own. Compare, e.g., Brenes-Laroche v. Toledo Davila, 682 F.
Supp. 2d 179, 187–88 (D.P.R. 2010) (general allegations of defendants’ state of mind found
sufficient); Capps v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n, No. CV 09-752-PK, 2009 WL 5149135, at *1
(D. Or. Dec. 28, 2009) (general allegations assumed to include specific facts necessary to
support them); Young v. Speziale, No. 07-03129, 2009 WL 3806296, at *6–9 (D.N.J. Nov.
10, 2009) (general allegations may be sufficient in deliberate indifference context.), with
First Med. Health Plan, Inc. v. CaremarkPCS Caribbean, Inc., 681 F. Supp. 2d 111, 117–20
(D.P.R. 2010) (general allegation of state of mind insufficient); Fabian v. Dunn, No. SA-08cv-269-X9, 2009 WL 2567866, at *5 n.2 (W.D. Tex. Aug. 14, 2009) (allegation that
defendants acted with deliberate indifference is conclusory). Courts also differ over whether
an allegation that a defendant “knew” or was “aware” of a particular fact is conclusory or
factual. Compare, e.g., Jones v. Hashagen, No. 4:09-CV-889, 2010 WL 128316, at *4 (M.D.
Pa. Jan. 12, 2010) (plaintiff’s allegation that the superintendent “failure to take action to curb
Inmate Mitchell’s pattern of assaults, known or should have been known to [him], [and]
constituted deliberate indifference” is conclusory (alterations in original) (internal quotation
marks omitted)); Smith v. Dist. of Columbia, 674 F. Supp. 2d 209, 211–13 (D.D.C. 2009)
(allegation that District “knew of” specific systemic problems with medical care in prisons
was conclusory); Kasten v. Ford Motor Co., No. 09-11754, 2009 WL 3628012, at *6 (E.D.
Mich. Oct. 30, 2009) (allegation of defendant’s awareness insufficient without some
statement of source of awareness); Choate v. Merrill, No. 08-24-B-W, 2009 WL 3487768, at
*6 (D. Me. Oct. 20, 2009) (in Eighth Amendment case, allegation of supervisor’s knowledge
of and indifference to lack of adequate life-saving equipment and training was conclusory);
Garvins v. Hofbauer, No. 2:09-cv-48, 2009 WL 1874074, at *4 (W.D. Mich. June 26, 2009)
(allegation that defendants were “aware” of plaintiff’s medical condition insufficient to state
claim for deliberate indifference), with Mallinckrodt Inc. v. E-Z-Em Inc., 671 F. Supp. 2d
563, 569 (D. Del. 2009) (in patent case, the plaintiff satisfied the pleading standard for an
infringement claim by alleging that defendant “became aware” of patent “shortly after” its
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benefits and disadvantages of heightened pleading standards. After all, the
transition to heightened pleading has been a long time in the making. Even as the
Court was consistently rejecting fact pleading standards in the 1990s and early
2000s, Congress, in 1995, chose to impose higher pleading standards in the
securities litigation context.66 And prior to Iqbal and Twombly the Civil Rules
Advisory Committee spent numerous meetings discussing potential adjustments to
notice pleading, usually opting to postpone any action in part because lower courts
seemed to be demanding more rigorous pleading despite the Supreme Court’s
contrary pre-Twombly holdings.67 Other than Stephen Choi’s notable work
regarding securities litigation,68 and though heightened pleading standards are back
in vogue to a certain extent, there has been no empirical inquiry into their
effectiveness in filtering out meritless claims. It is to this question that I now turn.

issuance and that defendants “actively induced” infringing acts); Decker v. Borough of
Hughestown, No. 3:09-cv-1463, 2009 WL 4406142, at *4 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 25, 2009)
(allegation that defendants “knew or should have known of plaintiff’s right to express
himself in such a manner” was sufficient to support failure to train claim in First
Amendment Monell case (internal quotation marks omitted)); Lewis v. Jordon, No.
1:09CV21, 2009 WL 3718883, at *5 (M.D.N.C. Nov. 4, 2009) (Fourth Amendment claim
sufficient where complaint alleged that “Defendant Robinson . . . arrested Plaintiff without
probable cause and that Defendants knew there was no probable cause”); Smith v.
Sangamon Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, No. 07-3150, 2009 WL 2601253, at *4 (C.D. Ill. Aug. 20,
2009) (allegation of sheriff’s knowledge that he had housed plaintiff with a violent inmate
was not conclusory); Vaden v. Campbell, No. 4:09cv12-RH, 2009 WL 1919474, at *3 (N.D.
Fla. July 2, 2009) (allegation of sheriff’s knowledge of deputy’s propensity for sexual
assault was not conclusory); Schoppell v. Schrader, No. 1:08-CV-284, 2009 WL 1886090, at
*5–7 (N.D. Ind. June 30, 2009) (allegation that county council was on notice that jail was
inadequately funded and understaffed, and that another inmate had died because of
inadequate medical care, sufficient to state § 1983 claim based on inadequate funding).
Limitations of space and time prevent me from providing all of the examples of the differing
interpretations that lower courts have adopted when applying Iqbal and Twombly.
66. See Choi, supra note 22, at 603.
67. See Civil Rules Advisory Committee Minutes 37–38 (May 22–23, 2006), available
at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Minutes/CV05-2006-min.pdf;
Civil Rules Advisory Committee Minutes 30 (Oct. 27–28, 2005), available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Minutes/CV11-2005-min.pdf.
Indeed, the Advisory Committee’s reference to the possibility of emphasizing “the often
forgotten words: ‘showing that the pleader is entitled to relief’” eerily foreshadows the
Supreme Court’s own heightened attention to those words in Iqbal. Compare Civil Rules
Advisory
Committee
Minutes
31
(Oct.
27–28,
2005),
available
at
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Minutes/CV11-2005-min.pdf,
with Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950 (finding a difference between alleging an entitlement to relief
and “showing” such an entitlement).
68. Choi, supra note 22. Choi’s study does not purport to determine the outcome of
thinly pleaded cases; rather, it uses publicly available information to estimate the degree to
which the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat.
737 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.), has deterred the filing of valid
securities fraud cases.
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II. METHODOLOGY
As described above, the goal of this paper is to hazard a prediction of one of the
costs, as measured by dismissals of meritorious cases, of imposing the
Iqbal/Twombly pleading standard in all civil cases. There are many different ways
to estimate the effects of such a rule. The ideal means would be to identify all cases
dismissed as a result of the Iqbal/Twombly standard, independently assess the
dismissed complaints for the merit of their underlying claims, and compare the
distribution of merit in that set of cases with the distribution of merit in claims that
survive the application of plausibility pleading standards. The impossibility of
achieving this level of omniscience should be evident from the outset.69 Instead, we
are left with many different imperfect approaches, a typical problem in empirical
inquiries.
Some observers have focused on the differences in dismissal rates pre-Twombly,
pre-Iqbal, and post-Iqbal.70 The purpose of such study is to estimate whether
application of Iqbal and Twombly is resulting in more dismissals of cases at the
pleading stage.71 This approach, while important and useful, has many significant
disadvantages. First, as noted above, because cases are dismissed, one has no way
of knowing whether the dismissals were “false negatives” or not.72 Second, the rate
of dismissal is of limited utility if defendants are emboldened by decisions like
Iqbal to bring motions to dismiss in contexts where they never would have been
considered in the past.73 Thus, although the rate of dismissal may stay the same (or

69. See Spencer, supra note 24, at 24.
70. See Patricia W. Hatamyar, The Tao of Pleading: Do Twombly and Iqbal Matter
Empirically?, 59 AM. U. L. REV. 553, 556 (2010) (estimating that motions to dismiss were
four times more likely to be granted after Iqbal as they were during the Conley era, after
controlling for relevant variables); Joseph A. Seiner, The Trouble with Twombly: A
Proposed Pleading Standard for Employment Discrimination Cases, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV.
1011, 1014 (showing effect of Twombly standard on published opinions regarding
employment discrimination cases); Kendall W. Hannon, Note, Much Ado About Twombly?
A Study on the Impact of Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly on 12(b)(6) Motions, 83 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1811, 1837 (2008) (reporting a civil rights dismissal rate of 41.7% under the
pre-Twombly standard and 52.9% under Twombly, using only reported cases between 2006
and 2007); Statistics Div., Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts, supra note 12.
71. At last count, Iqbal had been cited in more than fourteen thousand decisions, but
this does not tell us much about its impact. After all, most courts are presumably citing Iqbal
because it is the most recent Supreme Court decision addressing pleading.
72. By “false negative,” I mean only that the dismissing body incorrectly assessed the
ultimate merit of the complaint. I recognize that most advocates of heightened pleading do
not explicitly maintain that courts should be judging the merits of a case at the pleading
stage; however, as described above, most heightened pleading supporters assume that it will
be most effective in dismissing cases that have no merit. See supra text accompanying notes
19–23.
73. This was the instinct of an experienced judge from the Northern District of Illinois
who, during an oral argument of a motion to dismiss, expressed the view that defense
counsel were overstating Iqbal. See Transcript of Proceedings Before the Honorable Milton
I. Shadur at 2, Madison v. City of Chicago, No. 09 C 3629 (Aug. 10, 2009). Judge Shadur
also has referred to the defense bar’s penchant for summary judgment motions as
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even decrease) after a case like Iqbal, this could obscure the fact that a broader
range of cases are being subject to dismissal than before. Finally, using only
published opinions to examine changes in the rate of dismissal, as some scholars
have done, creates potentially serious problems of selection bias.74
This paper takes a different approach by looking backwards at a subset of cases
litigated during the Conley era. Much like a retrospective cohort study, used by
epidemiologists to study the relationship between a particular exposure and a health
outcome, the design I use here seeks to identify whether there is a relationship
between sparse pleading and the merit of a case (as measured by the case’s ultimate
outcome).75 The methodology was comprised of three steps: first, I looked to
appellate cases decided during the years 1990 to 1999 to identify a set of cases in
which the pleadings would likely be subject to dismissal under an Iqbal/Twombly
standard, but which were considered sufficient under Conley’s liberal rule; second,
I followed those cases after they had been remanded to the district court to
determine their ultimate resolution, generating an estimate of the “success”76 of
thinly pleaded cases during this time period; and third, I compared the rate of
success in the thinly pleaded cases I identified with the success of all cases litigated
during the same time period for which there are records supplied by the
Administrative Office of the United States Courts (“Administrative Office”). Each
of these steps has specific methodological considerations and difficulties.
The process of identifying cases in which the pleadings are particularly thin is
amenable to several approaches. Perhaps the most comprehensive would be to
review all district court case files, or a representative sample, and subject the
pleadings to a de novo reading by civil procedure experts. This methodology, while
offering the potential for inclusiveness, was rejected because it poses certain
interpretive problems, particularly with regard to how to decide exactly how “thin”
a pleading is. In addition, because this approach does not account for judicial
“Pavlovian,” so perhaps it should be no surprise that he is concerned that motions to dismiss
will become similarly routine. See Milton I. Shadur, An Old Judge’s Thoughts, CBA
RECORD (Chi. B. Ass’n, Chi., Ill.), Jan. 2004, at 27, 27.
74. See Clermont & Yeazell, supra note 16, at 839 n.66 (detailing potential selection
bias in the Hatamyar, Seiner, and Hannon studies).
75. See generally CHARLES H. HENNEKENS & JULIE E. BURING, EPIDEMIOLOGY IN
MEDICINE 153–56 (Sherry L. Mayrent ed., 1987) (providing a general discussion of the use
of cohort studies in epidemiology). In brief, a retrospective cohort study attempts to
determine the relationship between an exposure and a disease by looking at exposed and
unexposed individuals and calculating the prevalence of a particular health outcome in each
group. Id. at 154. In prospective studies, researchers follow exposed and unexposed
individuals, sometimes tightly controlling the level of exposure, and determine health
outcomes. Id. at 154–55. In case-control studies, researchers first identify individuals with
and without disease and then determine the level of exposure to a particular determinant
within each group. Id. at 156.
76. The difficulty of settling on a precise measure of success is discussed in more detail
below, see infra text accompanying notes 93–102, 146–59, but compared to most empirical
studies, I have defined success narrowly as either a judgment or a settlement. See, e.g.,
Stewart J. Schwab & Theodore Eisenberg, Explaining Constitutional Tort Litigation: The
Influence of the Attorney Fees Statute and the Government as Defendant, 73 CORNELL L.
REV. 719, 726–27 (1988) (including voluntary dismissals and dismissals for failure to
prosecute, along with settlements and judgments, as successful outcomes).
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perceptions of thinness, this methodology would most likely fail to capture the
feature of Iqbal that depends on judges’ assessments of plausibility, based on their
common sense and judicial experience.
Instead of a randomized or comprehensive case selection process, I attempted to
use a search method that would identify that subset of cases most likely to be
vulnerable to dismissal based on the pleading principles articulated in Iqbal and
Twombly. Such cases were identified in the following manner. First, I reviewed
every appellate case announced between January 1, 1990, and January 1, 2000, in
which Conley was cited as authority for any proposition.77 Of these cases, those in
which a motion to dismiss had been granted in the lower court were selected for
study. Those cases in which the dismissal was affirmed were not considered,
because there is no way of determining their ultimate merit, similar to the
previously mentioned difficulty in determining the impact of Iqbal and Twombly.
Of those cases in which the dismissal was reversed, care was taken to identify
whether the basis for reversal was a ground that would be in jeopardy because of
the Iqbal/Twombly pleading standard. For instance, if an appellate court reversed
because the district court had disregarded an allegation as being too conclusory due
to the fact that it simply mirrored the elements of a cause of action, the case was
considered part of the cohort.78 If a dismissal was reversed because the appellate
court stated that the district court considered alternative explanations for the
conduct at issue that were not found in the complaint, the case was considered to be
part of the cohort.79 Similarly, if a dismissal was reversed because the complaint
contained a bald allegation of state of mind or conspiracy, with no other factual
support, it was included in the cohort.80 And finally, if the appellate court relied on
the language from Conley that Twombly unceremoniously “retired”—that is, that a

77. I used Westlaw’s KeyCite function to accomplish this. I included both published
and unpublished appellate decisions in the sample.
78. See, e.g., Yamaguchi v. U.S. Dep’t of the Air Force, 109 F.3d 1475, 1481 (9th Cir.
1997) (reversing dismissal in employment discrimination claim where plaintiff’s complaint
was “inartfully crafted, [but] in light of the liberal pleading standards, . . . presents an
adequate claim of sex discrimination”). This approach to resolving pleading questions seems
to be called into question by Iqbal. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009).
79. See, e.g., Northington v. Jackson, 973 F.2d 1518, 1522 (10th Cir. 1992) (“In this
case the district court did not consider any potential legal issues which arise from
[plaintiff]’s allegations. Instead, it foreclosed legal analysis by concluding that the
allegations were false, and it based this determination on [defendant]’s testimony at the
telephonic evidentiary hearing.”). These cases were included in the cohort because under
Iqbal, district courts are encouraged to rely on their “judicial experience and common sense”
to consider alternative explanations for the conduct alleged in a plaintiff’s complaint, even if
such explanations are found outside of the pleadings. See Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950.
80. See, e.g., In re Johannessen, 76 F.3d 347, 350 (11th Cir. 1996); Atchinson v. Dist. of
Columbia, 73 F.3d 418, 423 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (finding allegation of municipal liability under
§ 1983 sufficient where plaintiff alleged a single instance of misconduct and a conclusory
allegation of failure to train). These allegations were sufficient under Conley but are almost
certainly now insufficient under Iqbal and Twombly. See Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1954 (rejecting
the argument that state of mind allegations can be made generally); Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 565 n.10 (2007) (holding that bare allegation of conspiracy is
insufficient without more to establish this element of an antitrust claim).
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reviewing court was to imagine whether the plaintiff could prove “any set of facts”
consistent with liability prior to dismissal—it was included in the study.81 Each of
these determinations was difficult to make and decisions at the borders would
surely invite debate.82
There were many reasons to use this method of case selection. First, it was
assumed that an appellate court’s citation of Conley was meant to emphasize the
notice aspect of Rule 8 pleading, given Conley’s standing at the time. Presumably,
one could have looked to appellate cases that cited other authority also associated
with notice pleading—for example, Hishon v. King & Spalding83 or Cruz v.
Beto84—but Conley has long been a symbol of notice pleading;85 there is no reason
to think that there would be a merits-based difference between cases that elicit an
appellate court to cite Conley in support of reversal as opposed to some other notice
pleading precedent.86 At the same time, not every citation of Conley indicates that
the appellate decision would be in tension with the Iqbal/Twombly rule. Thus, close
review of the appellate court’s decision-making process was necessary to
specifically identify those cases in tension with Iqbal and Twombly. Importantly,
the review of these cases for their inclusion in the cohort was performed prior to
conducting any follow-up of the cases on remand. This mitigates any concern that
the initial review for inclusion in the cohort was not “blind” to outcome.87

81. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 561–63.
82. For instance, if an appellate court referred to the “any set of facts” language but
addressed the legal status of a particular cause of action rather than the sufficiency of the
pleadings, the case was not considered part of the cohort. See, e.g., Enweremadu v. Reichlin,
No. 92-1845, 1993 WL 311914, at *3 (4th Cir. Aug. 8, 1993) (holding that the district court
erred in dismissing the action because the complaint cited only the Fourth Amendment and
not the Fourteenth Amendment). In any event, anyone wishing to test the validity of the
judgments made about each case can review the cases as they are clearly identified below.
See infra Appendix, Table 1.
83. 467 U.S. 69 (1984).
84. 405 U.S. 319 (1972) (per curiam).
85. This is reflected in citation counts for the three cases. According to Westlaw’s
KeyCite feature, over the specified time period, Cruz was cited in 108 appellate decisions,
Hishon was cited in almost 250 appellate cases, and Conley was cited in 867 appellate cases.
If one limits the citations to pleading-related headnotes (which is admittedly putting a high
degree of faith in Westlaw’s editors), Cruz was cited in 38 cases, Hishon in 197, and Conley
in 845.
86. There might, of course, be a difference in the kind of case that elicits a Conley
citation versus, say, a Cruz citation. Conley was a discrimination case, and Cruz was a
prisoners’ rights case. Therefore, one might expect that appellate courts considering prisoner
appeals would be more likely to cite Cruz than Conley in support of reversal. This difference
might affect the proportion of prison cases in the sample, but there is no reason to think that
prisoner cases that elicit a Conley citation are more or less likely to be meritorious than
prisoner cases that elicit a Cruz citation. Nonetheless, for future research it might be useful
to include appellate decisions citing to Cruz and Hishon, if only to increase the sample size.
87. One should always attempt to minimize observation bias in empirical studies, and
“blinding” researchers to outcomes is one approach to such minimization. See HENNEKENS
& BURING, supra note 75, at 192 (discussing blinding in the context of health intervention
studies).
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It would be possible to expand the cohort by adding all district court decisions
in which a motion to dismiss was denied in the first instance, and in which
Conley’s disfavored language was cited by the district court.88 Including these
cases may be more comprehensive and eliminate some of the selection biases that
might pervade the focus on appellate courts.89 On the other hand, because the cases
that will be dismissed under the Iqbal/Twombly pleading standard will likely be on
the margins of what was considered sufficient pleading under Conley, selecting
cases through appellate reversals has the advantage of identifying cases in which
judicial actors disagreed about the sufficiency of the pleading under Conley. In any
event, the results reported here argue in favor of broader testing of the empirical
inquiry, whether through expanding the cohort of appellate cases examined or
through direct sampling from district court cases.
Once the cohort was identified, the second methodological step was to
determine the ultimate outcome of all cases included in the cohort. As a technical
matter, this was relatively straightforward. I consulted electronic dockets
maintained by the Public Access to Court Electronic Records (PACER)90 website,
which recorded most outcomes, and when necessary I contacted specific attorneys
or litigants to clarify lingering uncertainties. Cases were divided into the following
outcome categories: (1) judge or jury verdict, (2) settlement, (3) stipulated
dismissal, (4) summary judgment, (5) involuntary dismissal, and (6) other.91 No
distinction was made between judge and jury verdicts, because the presumption of
the study is that a fact finder’s conclusion is dispositive of the merits of the case.92

88. Such cases would be identified not by using appellate decisions as a filter, but by
searching district court opinions directly.
89. See infra Part IV.C.
90. PACER Serv. Ctr., Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts, PACER: PUB. ACCESS TO
COURT ELEC. RECORDS, http://www.pacer.gov/.
91. In addition to coding the cases for outcome, coding was made for the following
categories: circuit, district, year of filing, year of resolution, pro se status on appeal, pro se
status on remand, case type (by Administrative Office code), and case type (descriptive).
The code for case type consisted of the following categories: antitrust, civil rights
(nonprisoner), civil rights (prisoner), consumer, contract, employment discrimination,
ERISA, RICO, securities fraud, and tort. Only nine cases could not be coded according to
these categories and were lumped together as “other.”
92. This presumption is subject to dispute, and some have certainly argued that juries
are not reliable fact finders. See, e.g., Elliott M. Abramson, The Medical Malpractice
Imbroglio: A Non-Adversarial Suggestion, 78 KY. L.J. 293, 294 (1990) (criticizing
malpractice juries for basing verdicts on sympathy for injured party); David E. Bernstein,
Learning the Wrong Lessons from “An American Tragedy”: A Critique of the BergerTwerski Informed Choice Proposal, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1961, 1975 (2006) (expressing
concern regarding the role played by juror sympathies in cases involving birth defects); Peter
A. Drucker, Class Certification and Mass Torts: Are “Immature” Tort Claims Appropriate
for Class Action Treatment?, 29 SETON HALL L. REV. 213, 222–23 (1998) (describing ways
juries can be misled in toxic tort cases). But see ROBERT P. BURNS, THE DEATH OF THE
AMERICAN TRIAL 31 (2009) (“The moral sources that are actualized at trial exist in the life
world of the jurors. They are the negotiated truths that made a certain way of life possible.
They are not arbitrary; neither is a decision derived from them, duly actualized and refined.
Least of all is it ‘purely emotional.’”); Rachel E. Barkow, Recharging the Jury: The
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The settlement and stipulated dismissal categories are relatively straightforward.
However, it should be noted that, while most empirical studies categorize stipulated
dismissals and voluntary dismissals together for the purposes of judging ultimate
success,93 this study has not. Only judgments for the plaintiff, settlements, or
stipulated dismissals are considered successful resolutions in this study, because in
each of these circumstances there is the assurance (or the strong indication) that a
plaintiff has received something of value through litigation. Efforts were made in
every case to confirm, by personal communication with counsel or a litigant,
whether stipulated dismissals in fact represented settlements by another name. But
the underlying assumption is that a settlement is a successful outcome, and that
successful outcomes are suggestive of merit.94
Reliance on settlement as reflecting the merit of a lawsuit is not without its
risks. There are many who argue that some percentage of settlements are coercive
and are not indicative of the underlying merit of the plaintiff’s position.95 On the
other hand, some researchers quite reasonably maintain that counting settlements
and verdicts but not including voluntary dismissals ignores the arguably safe
assumption that a plaintiff would not agree to dismiss a case without obtaining
something of value in return.96 The view that settlements are often the result of
Criminal Jury’s Constitutional Role in an Era of Mandatory Sentencing, 152 U. PA. L. REV.
33, 78 (2003) (defending the need for a jury even in the face of criticisms that verdicts are
the product of emotion and sympathy). For those who believe that jury verdicts are often the
product of irrationality, it is doubtful that any indication of success would be a satisfactorily
reliable correlate of merit. Indeed, it is unlikely that any aspect of the project undertaken in
this Article would seem worthwhile to one who discounts all jury verdicts as the product of
irrationality.
93. See, e.g., Margo Schlanger, Inmate Litigation, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1555, 1592–93
(2003); Schwab & Eisenberg, supra note 76, at 726–27.
94. There may be many reasons that a defendant enters into a settlement agreement,
some of which reflect a judgment about merit and some of which reflect other concerns. See
infra notes 148–55 and accompanying text.
95. See, e.g., Patrick E. Longan, The Shot Clock Comes to Trial: Time Limits for
Federal Civil Trials, 35 ARIZ. L. REV. 663, 684–85 (1993) (distinguishing between just and
unjust settlements, with the latter the result of coercion such as unequal bargaining power).
Much of the academic commentary has focused on class action litigation. See, e.g., John C.
Coffee, Jr., The Regulation of Entrepreneurial Litigation: Balancing Fairness and Efficiency
in the Large Class Action, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 877, 878 (1987); Myriam Gilles, Opting Out of
Liability: The Forthcoming, Near-Total Demise of the Modern Class Action, 104 MICH. L.
REV. 373, 387–88 (2005) (describing class action decertification decisions that are motivated
in part by concern that certification will leave defendants with no choice but to settle). Some
commentators have used strong language indeed, comparing settlements obtained after
certification decisions to blackmail. See Bruce Hay & David Rosenberg, “Sweetheart” and
“Blackmail” Settlements in Class Actions: Reality and Remedy, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1377 (2000). But see Melissa Hart, Will Employment Discrimination Class Actions Survive?,
37 AKRON L. REV. 813, 840 (2004) (suggesting that settlement of recent employment class
action discrimination claims was driven by “strong evidence on the merits”).
96. Compare Schwab & Eisenberg, supra note 76, at 727–28 (explaining, with caveats,
reliance on voluntary dismissals), with Gillian K. Hadfield, Exploring Economic and
Democratic Theories of Civil Litigation: Differences Between Individual and Organizational
Litigants in the Disposition of Federal Civil Cases, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1275, 1309–11 (2005)
[hereinafter Hadfield, Civil Litigation] (auditing Administrative Office coding of voluntary
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coercion is founded at least in part on the assumption that plaintiffs often file suit
for trivial or nonexistent grievances, in the hope of obtaining a favorable settlement
without expending substantial cost.97 This assumption, however, is inconsistent
with social science data that suggest that the vast majority, approaching ninety
percent, of legally cognizable grievances are never brought to court.98 It is thus fair
to assume that the disputes in which litigation is initiated often reflect grievances
that are perceived to be real and worthy of the high cost of litigation. There are also
good reasons to think that those cases that are settled are mostly cases in which
there is substantial agreement between the parties as to the likely outcome of the
case were it to litigate to judgment, at least where the parties have a relatively
accurate sense of the damages that are at stake.99 This is particularly true for cases
that are settled after discovery has terminated, because in that posture, both parties
have access to the full spectrum of information that will likely be produced at
trial.100
In some sense, I can be agnostic on whether settlements are reflective of the
validity of a claim. I have, in the past, used voluntary dismissals as a relevant
indication of success,101 and there is merit in doing so.102 My agnosticism is driven
more by the fact that, however one defines success, any comparisons should be
made using the same measure. Thus, what indicator one uses for success is less
important than ensuring that one uses the same indicators of success across the two
comparison cohorts.103
and other dismissals and finding that they are not closely correlated with settlements) and
Gillian K. Hadfield, Where Have All the Trials Gone? Settlements, Nontrial Adjudications,
and Statistical Artifacts in the Changing Disposition of Federal Civil Cases, 1 J. EMPIRICAL
LEGAL STUD. 705 (2004) [hereinafter Hadfield, Trials] (finding errors in general
Administrative Office coding).
97. See generally Randy J. Kozel & David Rosenberg, Solving the Nuisance-Value
Settlement Problem: Mandatory Summary Judgment, 90 VA. L. REV. 1849, 1850 & n.1
(2004) (summarizing literature and stating that “[t]o employ a nuisance-value strategy, a
litigant asserts a plainly meritless claim or defense in order to extract a payoff based on the
cost the other party would incur to have the claim or defense dismissed by the court under a
standard dispositive motion, like summary judgment”).
98. David M. Trubek, Austin Sarat, William L.F. Felstiner, Herbert M. Kritzer & Joel
B. Grossman, The Costs of Ordinary Litigation, 31 UCLA L. REV. 72, 86–87 (1983) (relying
on study of disputes in “eight selected general areas—tort, consumer, debt, discrimination,
property, government, post-divorce and landlord-tenant”). See generally ROBERT C.
ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES (1991) (describing a
system of informal dispute resolution in the cattle industry); Robert J. Rhee, Tort Arbitrage,
60 FLA. L. REV. 125, 129 (2008) (remarking that most disputes are resolved without a lawsuit
being filed).
99. See Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Litigation Realities, 88 CORNELL L.
REV. 119, 138 (2002).
100. Most of the settlements or stipulated dismissals in the cohort of cases studied here
took place after discovery was complete. See infra notes 152–54 and accompanying text.
101. Alexander A. Reinert, Measuring the Success of Bivens Litigation and Its
Consequences for the Individual Liability Model, 62 STAN. L. REV. 809, 833 (2010).
102. See, e.g., Schwab & Eisenberg, supra note 76, at 727–28.
103. This principle only goes so far. It is hard to consider a case that is transferred to
another district as successful or unsuccessful, at least in the sense that one means to study
something about the merit of the claims being transferred.
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This brings me to the final step of the analysis: comparing the rate of success in
this cohort with the general rate of success among all cases resolved during this
time period. The principal source of comparison—the “control” group, for lack of a
better term—was created from the Administrative Office’s database of civil cases
terminated between 1990 and 2000.104 There are well-discussed problems with
relying solely on the Administrative Office’s database,105 so I have supplemented
the Administrative Office data with more specific and arguably more reliable data
generated by other researchers.106 In addition to comparing success rates at a cohort
and control-wide level, I also make comparisons based on pro se status and case
subject matter.
III. RESULTS
This section reviews the results of the study in two sections. First, I present the
data relevant to the cohort in Part A. In Part B, I discuss the principal “control”
group, the data gathered by the Administrative Office between 1990 and 2000.
Throughout, I discuss the relevant comparisons between the two groups,
supplemented by data provided by other researchers.
A. Cohort Characteristics
Of a total of 843 appellate decisions in which Conley was cited by a court, 745
involved decisions reviewing a motion to dismiss determination by a district
court.107 In 303 of these cases, the appellate court reversed the decision below and

104. See Federal Judicial Center, Federal Court Cases: Integrated Data Base, 1970–2000
(computer file, on file with the author), available at http://dx.doi.org/10.3886/ICPSR08429.
The database (in its entirety or a selected portion) can be downloaded from the InterUniversity Consortium for Political and Social Research. After downloading only the civil
terminations files from 1990 to 2000 (datasets 73, 74, 86, 87, 88, 98, 103, 104, 115, 116, and
117), I converted the text files for use in Stata/SE 10.1 and generated the data that I will
describe below. The Administrative Office data, being both expansive and publicly
available, are not included in the Appendix, but the converted files I used for analysis are
available on request. Eisenberg and Clermont also offer a useful online service that permits
users to run certain queries of the database. Theodore Eisenberg & Kevin M. Clermont,
JUDICIAL STATISTICAL INQUIRY, http://legal1.cit.cornell.edu:8090/.
105. See Theodore Eisenberg & Margo Schlanger, The Reliability of the Administrative
Office of the U.S. Courts Database: An Initial Empirical Analysis, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1455, 1460 (2003); Hadfield, Civil Litigation, supra note 96, at 1310–11; Schlanger, supra
note 93, at 1600 n.129.
106. See infra notes 135–37 and accompanying text.
107. Federal Circuit cases were excluded from consideration because of the specialized
nature of the court. See 28 U.S.C. § 1295 (defining the jurisdiction of the Federal Circuit);
Court Jurisdiction, U.S. CT. OF APPEALS FOR FED. CIRCUIT, http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/
index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=144&Itemid=27 (reporting that more
than half of Federal Circuit cases involve administrative law, 31% involve intellectual
property, and 11% involve damages claims against the United States government). Between
1990 and 1999, only twenty-three appellate cases in which Conley was cited came from the
Federal Circuit, and only nineteen of these involved appeals of disposition of motions to
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remanded for further proceedings. There are moderate to extreme variations in
reversal rates by circuit and year of decision, as reflected in Tables 1 and 2. Fisher
exact testing108 was conducted comparing reversal rates within each circuit to the
reversal rate of all other circuits combined, with the First, Sixth, Seventh, and
Tenth Circuits reporting significantly lower reversal rates and the Second, Third,
and Eleventh Circuits reporting significantly higher reversal rates.109 When one
considers reversal rates by year, there is less variation, with reversal rates in 1990
being significantly lower than all other years combined, and reversal rates in 1992
being significantly higher.110
Table 1: Reversal Rates, by Circuit111
Jurisdiction
Reversed (%)
Affirmed (%)
Total
Supreme Court
3 (100%)
0 (0%)
3
First Circuita
8 (25%)
24 (75%)
32
Second Circuita
53 (60.23%)
35 (39.77%)
88
Third Circuit b
9 (64.29%)
5 (35.71%)
14
Fourth Circuit
18 (41.86%)
25 (58.14%)
43
Fifth Circuit
21 (33.33%)
42 (66.67%)
63
Sixth Circuita
27 (31.03 %)
60 (68.97%)
87
Seventh Circuita
64 (35.16%)
118 (64.84%)
182
Eighth Circuit
17 (43.59%)
22 (56.41%)
39
Ninth Circuit
36 (47.37%)
40 (52.63%)
76
Tenth Circuita
18 (27.69%)
47 (72.31%)
65
Eleventh Circuita
16 (59.26%)
11 (40.74%)
27
D.C. Circuit
13 (50%)
13 (50%)
26
Total
303 (40.67%)
442 (59.33%)
745
a
: t<0.05, Fisher exact probability test, one-tailed; b: t<0.10, Fisher exact probability test
dismiss. Of these nineteen, ten of the circuit decisions vacated or reversed a lower court
decision dismissing a complaint.
108. Where feasible, Fisher exact testing is usually preferable to estimating variance by
chi-square testing. Robert Timothy Reagan, Federal Judicial Center Statistical Examples
Software Prototype: Age Discrimination Example, 42 JURIMETRICS 281, 288 (2002).
109. Clermont and others have reported some variation in reversal rates by circuit in
employment discrimination cases over a similar time frame. Kevin M. Clermont, Theodore
Eisenberg & Stewart J. Schwab, How Employment-Discrimination Plaintiffs Fare in the
Federal Courts of Appeals, 7 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 547, 561 Display 7 (2003).
110. See infra Table 2; infra Figure 2. There is no obvious explanation for these
differences; there was no intervening legal change or Supreme Court decision between 1990
and 1992 that would explain a significantly higher reversal rate in the latter.
111. Excluded from consideration are cases in which dismissals were not considered on appeal.
Thus, if Conley were cited in reviewing a jury verdict or summary judgment, it was not included in
the analysis of this study. Overall, only ninety-seven cases fell into this category, or 11.5%. There
was some variation by circuit: in the Supreme Court, three cases (50%) were not pleading cases,
one in the First Circuit (3.03%), seven in the Second (7.37%), six in the Third (30%), seven in the
Fourth (14%), eleven in the Fifth (14.86%), six in the Sixth (6.45%), ten in the Seventh (5.21%),
two in the Eighth (4.88%), twenty in the Ninth (20.83%), nine in the Tenth (12.16%), ten in the
11th (27.03%), and five in the D.C. Circuit (16.13%).
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Figure 1. Reversal Percentage, by Circuit
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Table 2. Reversal Rates, by Year
Year
Reversed (%)
Affirmed (%)
1990a
15 (27.27%)
40 (72.73%)
1991
33 (37.08%)
56 (62.92%)
1992a
32 (51.61%)
30 (48.39%)
1993
39 (42.39%)
53 (57.61%)
1994
44 (45.36%)
53 (54.64%)
1995
31 (39.74%)
47 (60.26%)
1996
23 (41.07%)
33 (58.93%)
1997
27 (45%)
33 (55%)
1998
33 (41.77%)
46 (58.23%)
1999
26 (33.77%)
51 (66.23%)
Total
303 (40.67%)
442 (59.33%)
a
: t<0.05, Fisher exact probability test, one-tailed

Total
55
89
62
92
97
78
56
60
79
77
745
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Figure 2. Reversal Percentage by Year of Decision
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Of the cases in which a lower court’s dismissal of a complaint was reversed,
slightly more than half112 can be clearly categorized as what I will refer to as
“Conley-based reversals”—that is, reversals that rested on the broad reading of
Conley that was rejected by Iqbal and Twombly. Again, there is a significant
amount of inter-circuit variation in the percentage of reversals that are categorized
as based on Conley. As described above, these cases were identified by a close
inspection of the reasoning of the reversing court and the appellate court’s
description of the pleadings at issue. For example, excluded from consideration
were reversals based on legal conclusions such as standing or whether a statute
created a cause of action.113 On the other hand, reversals that explicitly accepted the
truth of pleadings that the appellate court itself described as “conclusory”114 or
“sparse” were generally included in the cohort of Conley-based reversals.115 And
any appellate decision that explicitly rested its holding on the broad language of
Conley “retired” by Twombly—that a court must deny a motion to dismiss if it can
imagine “any set of facts” that establishes the defendant’s liability—was included
in the cohort.

112. See infra Table 3.
113. See, e.g., Comrie v. Bronx Lebanon Hosp., No. 97-7484, 1998 WL 29643 (2d Cir.
Jan. 27, 1998); B.F. Goodrich v. Betkoski, 99 F.3d 505 (2d Cir. 1996); Finlator v. Powers,
902 F.2d 1158 (4th Cir. 1990).
114. See, e.g., Addams v. City of Chicago, No. 92-4036, 1994 WL 64332, at *3 (7th Cir.
Mar. 2, 1994).
115. See, e.g., IUE AFL-CIO Pension Fund v. Herrmann, 9 F.3d 1049 (2d Cir. 1993).
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Table 3. Conley-Based Reversals, by Circuit
Jurisdiction
Conley Reversals (%)
Total Reversals
Supreme Court
2 (66.7%)
3
First Circuitb
2 (25.0%)
8
Second Circuitb
35 (66.0%)
53
Third Circuit
4 (44.4%)
9
Fourth Circuit
13 (72.2%)
18
Fifth Circuit
11 (52.4%)
21
Sixth Circuit
13 (48.2%)
27
Seventh Circuit
37 (57.8%)
64
a
Eighth Circuit
5 (29.4%)
17
Ninth Circuit
22 (61.1%)
36
Tenth Circuit
8 (44.4%)
18
Eleventh Circuit
7 (43.8%)
16
D.C. Circuit
9 (69.2%)
13
Total
168 (55.5%)
303
a
: t<0.05, Fisher exact probability test, one-tailed; b: 0.05<t<0.10, Fisher exact
probability test

Of the 168 cases that were reversed on Conley grounds, 137 were able to be
coded as successful or unsuccessful.116 Of these, seventy-six, or 55.5%, were
classified as successful, and sixty-one, or 44.5%, were classified as unsuccessful.
The breakdown of outcomes is detailed in Table 4.

116. For any case that could not be coded as successful or unsuccessful, I have made
every attempt to reach out to the litigants or attorneys involved. Many of the cases were
terminated over ten years ago, making follow-up difficult. Of the cases that could not be
coded as successful or unsuccessful, it is likely that at least fourteen of them involved
settlements, but this has not yet been confirmed. Thus, if they were added to the cohort, and
the additional cases lost to follow-up were all presumed to be unsuccessful, the success rate
would change to 53.5%.
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Table 4. Conley-Based Reversals, by Ascertainable Outcome117
Outcome
Successful
Settled
Stipulated Dismissal
(Settlement)
Plaintiff Verdict
Other
Total Successful
Unsuccessful
Dismissal
Summary Judgment
Defendant Verdict
Other
Total Unsuccessful
Total Cases

Cases

Frequency
49
21

35.7%
15.3%

3
3

2.2%
2.2%
55.5%

12
36
11
2

8.8%
26.3%
8.0%
1.5%
44.5%

76

61
137

Tables 5 and 6 break the cohort down according to case type, both
descriptively118 and by the “nature of suit” indicated by the plaintiff on the civil
cover sheet provided by the Administrative Office.119 Notably, civil rights cases,
including employment discrimination cases, comprised more than half of the
cohort.120 And antitrust and securities fraud cases together made up almost 10% of
the cohort. The success rate of civil rights cases is even more notable when one
appreciates the extent to which most pro se litigants were concentrated in those
case categories. As Table 7 demonstrates, thirty-one, or 22.6%, of the Conley
reversed cases were litigated by prisoners who were pro se on remand in the district
court.121 Of these thirty-one pro se litigants, only three, or just under 10%, were
successful, but twenty-nine were involved in civil rights cases, including

117. See infra Appendix Table 2 for the raw data upon which this table is based.
118. For each Conley-based reversal, I summarized the nature of the case according to
the terms in Table 5.
119. The Civil Cover Sheet used by most districts can be found at
http://www.uscourts.gov/forms/JS044.pdf.
120. The percentage of employment discrimination cases is consistent with national
figures, as employment discrimination cases have grown to be the category comprising the
largest single percentage of the federal civil docket, currently around 10%. Clermont &
Schwab, supra note 29, at 429. This explosion began in the 1990s, thought to be due in part
to the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, along with the Americans with Disabilities
Act of 1990 and the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993. Id. at 433 (noting that the 1991
Act added the right to a jury trial and compensatory and punitive damages, among other
relief). Clermont and Schwab note that, notwithstanding the availability of the ADA and the
FMLA, Title VII is the driving force behind employment discrimination claims because
almost 70% of employment discrimination cases arise under Title VII. Id.
121. Some litigants were pro se on appeal, but were granted motions for appointment of
counsel after reversal. E.g., Zarnes v. Rhodes, 64 F.3d 285 (7th Cir. 1995).
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employment discrimination.122 Thus, as Table 9 reflects, when only counseled
cases are considered, the success of civil rights cases, including employment
discrimination cases, jumps considerably. As will be discussed below, this is
consistent with other research demonstrating a positive correlation between
ultimate success and the assistance of counsel.123 In addition, any statistically
significant differences between the success of these case types and the rest of the
cohort disappear, such that only securities fraud cases continue to have a
statistically significant higher success rate.
Table 5. Conley-Based Reversals, by Case Type and Success
Case Type
Tort
Contractb
Employment Discrimination
Prisona
Antitrustb
Non-Prison Civil Rights
Consumer
RICO
Sec. Frauda
ERISA
Other
Total
a
: t<0.05, Fisher’s exact test,
tailed

Success (%)
Unsuccessful (%)
Total (%)
6 (46.2%)
7 (53.8%)
13 (9.5%)
6 (85.7%)
1 (14.3%)
7 (5.1%)
14 (66.7%)
7 (33.3%)
21 (15.3%)
5 (21.7%)
18 (78.3%)
23 (16.8%)
7 (87.5%)
1 (12.5%)
8 (5.8%)
17 (48.6%)
18 (51.4%)
35 (25.5%)
3 (60%)
2 (40%)
5 (3.6%)
2 (50%)
2 (50%)
4 (2.9%)
6 (100%)
0
6 (4.3%)
3 (100%)
0
3 (2.1%)
7 (58.3%)
5 (41.7%)
12 (8.8%)
76 (55.5%)
61 (44.5%)
137
one-tailed; b: 0.05<t<0.10, Fisher’s exact test, one-

122. See infra Table 8. The percentage of employment discrimination cases proceeding
pro se is not all that different from what has been reported over the same time period for all
employment cases. Clermont & Schwab, supra note 29, at 434 tbl.1 (showing that almost
17% of employment discrimination plaintiffs proceeded pro se in district court between 1998
and 2001); id. app. at 457 (reporting that 19.8% of employment discrimination plaintiffs
proceeded pro se between 1979–2000, with 25.95% of non–employment discrimination
plaintiffs proceeding pro se, and 3.15% of contract and tort plaintiffs proceeding pro se).
123. See Theodore Eisenberg & Stewart J. Schwab, The Reality of Constitutional Tort
Litigation, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 641, 692 (1987); Schwab & Eisenberg, supra note 76, at
770–71, 773–74. As with other studies, these data do not show that having an attorney
causes an increase in success. It may just as well be the case that the merit of a litigant’s case
makes it more likely that an attorney will agree to represent her.
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Table 6. Conley-Based Reversals, by Administrative Office Code and Outcome
AO Code
110 (Insurance)
120 (Marine Contract)
140 (Neg. Instr.)
190 (Contract)
245 (Tort Prod. Liab.)
320 (Assault, Libel)
340 (Marine PI)
360 (Other PI)
362 (Med. Mal.)
370 (Other Fraud)
371 (TILA)
410 (Antitrust)
422 (Bank Appeal)
430 (Banks)
440 (Civ. Rights)
442 (Civ. Rights Jobs)
443 (Civ. Rights Accom.)
470 (Civil RICO)
550 (Prisoner-Civ. Rights)
710 (FLSA)
720 (LMRA)
790 (Other Labor)
791 (ERISA)
820 (Copyright)
840 (Trademark)
850 (Securities)
890 (Other Statutory)
895 (FOIA)
950 (State Statute
Constitutionality)
Total

Successful (%)
1 (100%)
1 (100%)
1 (100%)
6 (85.7%)
1 (100%)
1 (100%)
1 (100%)
5 (62.5%)
0
1 (50%)
1 (100%)
6 (85.7%)
2 (100%)
0
17 (51.5%)
8 (61.5%)
3 (75%)
4 (80%)
5 (23.8%)
1 (100%)
0
0
3 (75%)
0
1 (100%)
4 (100%)
3 (33.3%)
0
0

Unsuccessful (%)
0
0
0
1 (14.3%)
0
0
0
3 (37.5%)
1 (100%)
1 (50%)
0
1 (14.3%)
0
1 (100%)
16 (48.5%)
5 (38.5%)
1 (25%)
1 (20%)
16 (76.2%)
0
1 (100%)
1 (100%)
1 (25%)
1 (100%)
0
0
6 (66.7%)
2 (100%)
2 (100%)

Total
1
1
1
7
1
1
1
8
1
2
1
7
2
1
33
13
4
5
21
1
1
1
4
1
1
4
9
2
2

76 (55.5%)

61 (44.5%)

137

Table 7. Conley-Based Reversals, by Pro Se Representation and Outcome
Representation in
Unsuccessful (%)
Successful (%)
District Court
Counseleda
73 (68.9%)
33 (31.1%)
Pro Sea
3 (9.6%)
28 (90.4%)
Total
76 (55.5%)
61 (44.5%)
a
: t<0.05, Fisher exact probability test, one-tailed

Total
106
31
137
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Table 8. Conley-Based Reversals, by Pro Se Status and Case Type
Case Type
Tort
Contract
Employment
Discrimination
Prison
Antitrust
Non-prison civil
rights
Consumer
RICO
Sec Fraud
ERISA
Other
Total

Counseled (%)
11 (84.6%)
7 (100%)
18 (85.7%)

Pro Se (%)
2 (15.4%)
0
3 (14.3%)

Total
13
7
21

7 (30.4%)
8 (100%)
25 (71.4%)

16 (69.6%)
0
10 (28.6%)

23
8
35

5 (100%)
4 (100%)
6 (100%)
3 (100%)
12 (100%)
106 (77.4%)

0
0
0
0
0
31 (22.6%)

5
4
6
3
12
137

Table 9. Conley-Based Reversals, by Case Type and Outcome, Counseled
Plaintiffs Only
Case Type
Success (%)
Unsuccessful (%)
Tort
6 (54.5%)
5 (45.5%)
Contract
6 (85.7%)
1 (14.3%)
Employment
14 (77.8%)
4 (22.2%)
Discrimination
Prison
3 (42.8%)
4 (57.2%)
Antitrust
7 (87.5%)
1 (12.5%)
Non-Prison Civil
16 (64.0%)
9 (36.0%)
Rights
Consumer
3 (60%)
2 (40%)
RICO
2 (50%)
2 (50%)
Sec Frauda
6 (100%)
0
ERISA
3 (100%)
0
Other
7 (58.3%)
5 (41.7%)
Total
73 (66.4%)
33 (33.6%)
a
: t<0.10, Fisher exact probability test, one-tailed

Total
11
7
18
7
8
25
5
4
6
3
12
110

Thus, the success of the cohort can be briefly summarized as follows. When
considered as a whole, the rate of success is about 55%, with settlements and
stipulated dismissals accounting for nearly all of the successful outcomes. When
considered more closely, the data also reflect high levels of success for certain
categories of claims—most notably securities fraud, consumer, and contract
claims—as well as a high percentage of civil rights cases within the cohort. And
even the civil rights claims achieve a high degree of success, as will be shown by
comparison below to other reported data.
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B. “Control” Group Characteristics
As explained above, I used civil terminations from the years 1990 to 2000 to
serve as a control group for the cohort data. Although there is not a precise overlap
in terms of the years covered by the control group and the cohort, the vast majority
of cohort cases were resolved between the years 1990 and 2000. The control group,
consisting as it does of every civil case terminated during the relevant time frame,
is larger than the cohort by several orders of magnitude. In 1991 alone, 193,491
cases were terminated, and over the entire time period slightly more than 2.1
million cases were resolved by the federal courts.124
The analysis of the Administrative Office data was conducted in the following
manner: For all civil terminations between 1990 and 2000, the disposition and
prevailing party were cross-tabulated. Both of these variables can be coded in
unilluminating ways—for instance, prevailing party may be coded as “unknown”
or “both,” and disposition has eighteen different possible codings.125 Based on the
cross-tabulation, dispositions were then divided into four categories: plaintiff’s
success, defendant’s success, uncertain success, and excluded categories.126 Using
only the first three categories, absolute numbers and relative frequencies were
calculated for year-by-year dispositions between 1990 and 2000 and for particular
types of lawsuits. The year-by-year breakdown of the absolute number of cases that
fell within each category is reprinted in the Appendix.127 Tables 10a, 10b, and 10c
reflect the year-by-year breakdown of the outcome frequency within each category,
divided according to unsuccessful, successful, and questionable outcomes,
respectively.
Comparing these comprehensive data to the success rates observed in the cohort
of cases analyzed above, there are several observations to be made. Although there
is some significant variation in the overall success rate observed in the
Administrative Office data, particularly given the large sample size, the success
rate in the Conley-reversed cases appears to be well within the range of average
success rates of all cases terminated over this time period. Indeed, depending on

124. See infra Appendix Table 3.
125. The inaccuracies of the Administrative Office coding in the databases used here
have been remarked on above. See supra note 105 and accompanying text; see also
Hadfield, Trials, supra note 96 at 723–28 (reporting on an audit of Administrative Office
coding errors).
126. The following dispositions were considered clear plaintiff successes: default
judgment; consent judgment; jury, directed, or bench verdict for the plaintiff; judgment for
plaintiff by pretrial motion; judgment for plaintiff on other grounds; and settlement.
Defendant successes comprised the following: verdict for the defendant, both parties, or an
unknown party; dismissal for failure to prosecute or for lack of jurisdiction; judgment for
defendant or for both parties by pretrial motion; and judgment on other grounds for
defendant or for both parties. Uncertain success was defined as voluntary dismissal or other
dismissal. Excluded from consideration were the following dispositions: remand to state
court; remand to an agency; transfer to a different court or to the Judicial Panel on
Multidistrict Litigation, see 28 U.S.C. § 1407; judgments enforcing arbitration awards or on
de novo trial post-arbitration; stays for bankruptcy proceedings; statistical closings; and
dispositions related to magistrate judge appeals.
127. See infra Appendix Table 3.
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whether voluntary and other dismissals are properly categorized as successes or
not, it may be that the success rate in the Conley-reversed cases is, on average,
higher than in the generality of cases.128

128. It is important to caution against drawing too strong a conclusion from these data.
Aside from the size of the sample, most of the cohort cases have already overcome a
significant procedural hurdle—surviving a motion to dismiss. The same cannot be said of all
of the cases in the Administrative Office dataset.
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More importantly, however, when one compares the Conley-reversed cases
based on specific case type, it becomes more evident that the consequence of
applying an Iqbal/Twombly pleading rule will have a larger-than-considered effect
on meritorious cases. For instance, prisoners’ rights cases in the studied cohort
achieved success about 22% of the time.129 When looking specifically at cases with
the Administrative Office Code 550, success was achieved in almost 24% of cohort
cases, although the sample is admittedly small.130 This is significantly higher than
the 7% success rate achieved in prison cases overall,131 although, again, much
depends on whether voluntary and other dismissals may be counted as successes.132
If these last two disposition categories are considered successful, then the success
rate for prison cases in the cohort jumps to almost 52%.133 Similarly, when one
compares the success of non-prisoner civil rights claims in the cohort studied here,
best represented by Administrative Office Code 440, the rate of success in this
cohort is either slightly higher or lower than the overall rate, depending on how the
questionable cases fall.134 The same is true of employment discrimination cases
(best represented by Administrative Office Code 442), in which the Conleyreversed cases achieve as high a rate of success as the Administrative Office Code
442 cases even under the most expansive definition of success. One sees the same
pattern in contract and antitrust cases as well.

129. See supra Table 5.
130. See supra Table 6.
131. See infra Table 11b.
132. Eisenberg and Schlanger have reported that, with respect to prisoner cases, the
Administrative Office coding of plaintiff judgments is generally accurate, with some
marginal exceptions. Eisenberg & Schlanger, supra note 105.
133. The Administrative Office data for code 550 cases is perhaps the best example of
why one must be skeptical of the claim that all “other” dismissals should be considered
successful dispositions for prisoner-plaintiffs. As Tables 11b and 11c demonstrate, in every
case category other than prisoner cases, the settlement rate is always significantly higher
than the “other” dismissal rate. In prisoner cases, however, the rate for “other” dismissals is
more than five times the settlement rate. It is hard to imagine an explanation as to why
successful prisoner cases, as opposed to all other cases, would be more likely to be resolved
through “other” dismissals than through settlement. In addition, no other researcher has
reported success rates approaching 50% in prisoner cases. See, e.g., Schlanger, supra note
93, at 1557–58.
134. Compare supra Table 6 with infra Table 11b.
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In addition to the figures generated from the Administrative Office data, there
are more specific rates of success reported for particular areas of litigation. For
prisoner cases, estimates of success have ranged between 15% and 18%.135 In civil
cases that involve neither prisoners nor constitutional claims, rates of success have
been reported at much higher levels, between 65% and 85%.136 Constitutional tort
cases not involving prisoners have achieved success rates approaching 50%, and
employment discrimination cases have had success rates ranging between 55% and
80%.137 Each of these different sources is summarized in Table 12, including the
cohort data reported here and the data from the Administrative Office.
Table 12 reveals the large degree of similarity between the rates of success
reported here and the rates of success reported by other researchers and contained
within the Administrative Office data. Thus, although the overall rate of success of
the cohort studied here may be on the low side of the average success rate of all
cases combined in the Administrative Office database, it is likely explained by the
fact that civil rights and prisoners’ rights cases are overrepresented in the sample,
and these types of cases are generally less successful than contract and tort cases.138

135. Schlanger, supra note 93, at 1558; Schwab & Eisenberg, supra note 76, at 732–33
& tbl.IV; see also Eisenberg & Schwab, supra note 123, at 682. Schlanger included
judgment for the plaintiff, settlement, or voluntary dismissal as a metric for success.
Schlanger, supra note 93, at 1594–96. In prisoner cases, 6% to 7% were settled before trial,
1% received a judgment after trial, and 6% to 8% voluntarily dismissed their claims. Id. at
1597. Schwab and Eisenberg gathered data from three separate judicial districts for cases
filed from 1980 to 1981, and success included settlement, judgment, stipulated dismissal, or
voluntary dismissal. Schwab & Eisenberg, supra note 76, at 726–27.
136. See Theodore Eisenberg & Charlotte Lanvers, What Is the Settlement Rate and Why
Should We Care?, 6 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 111, 122 (2009) (reviewing studies of tort
litigation and antitrust claims reporting settlement rates of about 70% to 80% of filed cases);
id. at 130 tbl.3 (providing data showing success rates ranging from 64% to 87% for tort
claims and 65% to 73% for contract claims); Schwab & Eisenberg, supra note 76, at 732–33
& tbl.IV (reporting success rate of 84% for nonprisoner civil cases, excluding constitutional
tort cases); see also Eisenberg & Schwab, supra note 123, at 682 (reporting that plaintiffs in
contested non–civil rights cases succeeded in over 80% of all cases).
137. See Eisenberg & Lanvers, supra note 136, at 130 tbl.3 (providing data showing
success rates ranging from 27% to 45% for constitutional tort claims and 55% to 82% for
employment discrimination); Laura Beth Nielsen, Robert L. Nelson & Ryon Lancaster,
Individual Justice or Collective Legal Mobilization? Employment Discrimination Litigation
in the Post Civil Rights United States, 7 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 175, 188 (2010) (based
on review of randomly selected cases, reporting success by settlement or judgment of 60%
for employment discrimination cases); Schwab & Eisenberg, supra note 76, at 732–33 tbl.IV
(reporting a success rate of 50% for nonprisoner constitutional tort cases, defined to include
cases coded as 440, 441, 442, 443, and 444).
138. See infra Appendix Table 4 (showing the distribution within the Administrative
Office dataset of certain case codes among cases terminated between 1990 and 2000). Of
principal interest is the following: 6.8% of the terminated cases were civil rights cases (code
440); 13% were prison cases (code 550); 5.2% were antitrust (code 410); 7.6% were
employment discrimination cases (code 442); 7.6% were contract cases (code 190); 3.5%
were tort cases (code 360); and 3.7% were RICO cases (code 470). When one compares
these figures to the cohort, the cohort had fewer contract cases (5.1%), more prison cases
(15.3%), civil rights cases (24.1%), employment discrimination cases (9.5%), and tort cases
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This should not be surprising, as the cases that are most vulnerable to dismissal for
having thin pleadings are ones that rely on state of mind allegations, which are the
heart of most civil rights and private discrimination claims.139 Indeed, if the detail
of pleadings is more a reflection of information availability than merit, cases in
which state of mind plays a large role or in which there are large information
asymmetries, such as civil rights, constitutional, and employment discrimination
cases, are most likely to be vulnerable to accusations of thin pleading.140141142

(5.8%), and about the same number of antitrust (5.1%) and RICO cases (3.6%). See supra
Table 6. The starkest difference is in the frequency of civil rights cases (24.1% in the cohort
to 6.8% in the Administrative Office group), but even a marginal increase in prisoner cases
will drive success numbers down.
139. In an analogous context, researchers have found that non-nuisance securities
litigation claims in which hard evidence of fraud was lacking were less likely to be filed
after passage of the PSLRA, suggesting that the heightened pleading standard created by that
statute deterred filing of meritorious suits where evidence of wrongdoing was more difficult
for plaintiffs to acquire. See Stephen J. Choi, Karen K. Nelson & A.C. Pritchard, The
Screening Effect of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, 6 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL
STUD. 35, 37 (2009).
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IV. RAMIFICATIONS
The goal of this research project was to incorporate empirical data into the
debate over the value of pleading rules as screening devices. If we take the
controversy regarding the rules of pleading to revolve around the central question
of how best to filter out meritless claims without sacrificing meritorious claims, the
data collected from the cohort studied here (most notably, Tables 4, 5, 9, and 12)
provide good grounds to question the wisdom of the change in pleading adopted by
the Court in Iqbal and Twombly. This is so for several related reasons, best
explored by focusing first on the cohort data taken on its own and then by
comparing the cohort data to the cases reflected in the Administrative Office
database.
A. Likely Effect of Iqbal as Indicated by Cohort Success Rates
First, as the data in Table 4 reflect, under traditional definitions of “success,” the
rules of Iqbal and Twombly pose the potential to eliminate cases that have better
than a 50% chance of being successful. In other words, had the cohort cases been
litigated in a post-Iqbal era rather than in the Conley era, the application of
plausibility pleading standards would have screened out mostly meritorious cases,
not meritless ones. This is, of course, a contestable proposition; perhaps some of
the appellate courts that reversed dismissals in the Conley era also would make the
same judgment in a heightened pleading context. But it is worth recognizing that,
of the appellate cases that cited Conley between 1990 and 1999, only 41% of
dismissals by the district court that were then appealed were actually reversed.143
Thus, appellate courts were quite willing to affirm dismissals even in the liberal
notice pleading era; under a plausibility pleading standard, the cases that were
permitted to proceed in the cohort would have a much lower chance of proceeding
now. And more to the point, there is no reason to think that courts will be skillful in
determining which potentially dismissible case is most likely to be shown to be
meritorious. In other words, to the extent that advocates for heightened pleading
continue to maintain that it is an effective tool at filtering for merit, this paper
suggests that some empirical evidence should be presented to support that
contention.144 The absolute measures of success reported here reinforce data that
have previously been reported in the securities litigation arena145 and should
undermine the broad assumption that thinly pleaded cases are often meritless or,
worse, frivolous.

143. See supra Tables 1, 2.
144. For instance, one would expect that, in a heightened pleading world, cases that
survive motions to dismiss should be more likely to be successful than cases that survive
motions to dismiss in a notice pleading world. Some of this data may be obtainable now that
statutes like the PSLRA have been in effect for some time, but the initial empirical word on
the PSLRA suggests quite the opposite. See Choi, supra note 22, at 623 (suggesting that
rather than selectively deterring frivolous lawsuits, the PSLRA disproportionately
discouraged meritorious ones).
145. See Choi et al., supra note 139, at 64–65.
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It is, of course, true that relying on settlement as an indicator of merit has its
limitations, although most empirical studies to date have used even broader
measures of success, including voluntary dismissals and dismissals for failure to
prosecute.146 After all, the Court explicitly justified its adoption of the Twombly
rule based on its perception of the undue settlement pressures created by the high
cost of discovery in antitrust litigation.147 And despite the dearth of empirical
evidence supporting this assertion, there is at least an economically rational
explanation for parties to settle cases of questionable merit rather than litigate to
judgment.148 Settlement rates can also reflect strategic considerations.149 But
characteristics of the cohort studied here suggest that settlement is less likely to
reflect economic and strategic decisions to settle for nuisance value.150 It should be

146. See supra note 76 and accompanying text (indicating that studies have included
judgments, settlements, voluntary dismissals, and dismissals for failure to prosecute as
indicative of success). In this study, voluntary dismissals have been omitted from
consideration unless success or failure could be independently confirmed, and dismissals for
failure to prosecute have been coded as unsuccessful.
147. Needless to say, there is no empirical evidence demonstrating that high discovery
costs in complex litigation operate as a greater inducement to settle than perception of the
merits of the case. Indeed, a recent survey of the plaintiff and defense bars indicates that
attorneys consider discovery costs to almost routinely fall below 3.5% of their client’s stake
in the litigation, and the attorneys generally agree that discovery costs are lower than
expected. See Emery G. Lee III & Thomas E. Willging, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., NATIONAL,
CASE-BASED
CIVIL
RULES
SURVEY
43
(Oct.
2009),
available
at
http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/dissurv1.pdf/$file/dissurv1.pdf.
148. See, e.g., Peter H. Huang, Lawsuit Abandonment Options in Possibly Frivolous
Litigation Games, 23 REV. LITIG. 47 (2004). But see Patrick J. Borchers, Jurisdictional
Pragmatism: International Shoe’s Half-Buried Legacy, 28 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 561, 585
n.154 (1995) (noting that repeat players will hesitate to settle even when it is economically
rational to do so because of fear that settlement will induce frivolous litigation by others);
John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding the Plaintiff’s Attorney: The Implications of Economic
Theory for Private Enforcement of Law Through Class and Derivative Actions, 86 COLUM.
L. REV. 669 (1986) (criticizing economic theory that concludes there is excessive incentive
to litigate meritless cases).
149. Repeat players may settle cases that appear particularly meritorious so as to avoid
the development of unfavorable law, and plaintiffs’ counsel may have the opposite
motivation. Moreover, plaintiffs’ counsel may bring cases they know will lose so as to
develop the law or to develop discovery for the next set of cases. All of these factors may
influence settlement rates so as to create risks in interpreting the rates as indicators of
success.
150. By “nuisance value,” I mean a settlement that reflects economic considerations
about the cost of litigation rather than any judgment about likely merit. As explained below,
a significant portion of the settlements recorded here were in cases in which government
entities were defendants. For a variety of reasons, government entities may be less likely to
agree to a settlement as an economically motivated alternative to litigation. See Dawson v.
United States, 68 F.3d 886, 897–98 (5th Cir. 1995) (reversing district court’s sanction of a
government attorney who refused to make a settlement offer to a pro se prisoner because of
the government’s fear that settling prisoner claims will encourage other suits); Borchers,
supra note 148, at 585 n.154; Daniel Marcus & Jeffrey M. Senger, ADR and the Federal
Government: Not Such Strange Bedfellows After All, 66 MO. L. REV. 709, 712 (2001)
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remembered that each of the cases studied here involved situations in which a
motion to dismiss was litigated, appealed, and then remanded to the district court.
If a defendant is inclined to pay a nuisance settlement because of economic
considerations or for strategic reasons, that defendant may be less likely to incur
the considerable expense of moving to dismiss and defending an appeal.151 Of
course, it takes both parties to settle, and it is possible that a plaintiff will be more
likely to settle for nuisance value after having lost a motion to dismiss, or that
during the time that it has taken for the dismissal to be adjudicated the plaintiff may
perceive her injury as being less painful.152 But this same plaintiff would be
unlikely to be motivated to accept a nuisance settlement immediately after remand
from an appellate court decision that reversed an adverse decision by the trial court.
Thus, at the time immediately after remand, there is a reduced likelihood that a
settlement will reflect nuisance motivations; even if the defendant were then
inclined to offer a nuisance settlement, it is unlikely that a plaintiff would be
willing to accept it, having already successfully appealed one adverse decision. In
any event, most of the cases did not settle immediately on remand; instead, almost
75% of the time the parties engaged in some quantum of discovery before resolving
the case through motions or settlement.153 Most of the settlements or stipulated
dismissals took place after discovery.154 Thus, the pattern of litigation observed in
these cases undermines the contention that they are nuisance settlements.155
(explaining that some cases are harder for the government to settle if a lawsuit challenges
“the lawfulness of government action” or if there is a risk of “copycat litigation”). But see
Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep’t of Health & Human Res., 532 U.S.
598, 618 (2001) (Scalia, J., concurring) (referring to plaintiffs seeking attorneys’ fees from
government entities as “extortionist”); David S. Mendel, Note, Determining Ripeness of
Substantive Due Process Claims Brought by Landowners Against Local Governments, 95
MICH. L. REV. 492, 494–95 & n.9 (1996) (discussing claim that municipalities sometimes are
pressured to settle landowners’ suits because of potential costs of litigation).
151. Presumably, the incentive to offer a nuisance settlement changes as a case proceeds
from one procedural stage to the next. With each progression, the defendant’s expectation of
success and future litigation costs changes, but not always in predictable ways. Prior to
moving to dismiss, however, the defendant may predict that future litigation costs could be
high, and therefore may consider it an opportune time to negotiate a quick and inexpensive
settlement.
152. See John Bronsteen, Christopher Buccafusco & Jonathan S. Masur, Hedonic
Adaptation and the Settlement of Civil Lawsuits, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1516, 1536–40 (2008)
(arguing that a plaintiff “adapt[s] hedonically to her injury” over time and will adjust her
settlement demands accordingly).
153. See infra Appendix Table 5.
154. Of the eighty-seven cases in which there was some discovery after the case was
remanded to district court from the appellate court, thirty-six were successful via settlement
or stipulated dismissal, and five were successful in other ways. Of the thirty-one cases in
which it could be determined that there was no discovery, twenty-one were resolved via
settlement. Thus, most settlements occurred after discovery.
155. Another way to test nuisance settlements is by looking at the value of the settlement.
Because the settlement amount was not reported in the overwhelming majority of these
cases, and because counsel have indicated in follow-up correspondence that the settlement
amount of some cases is confidential, it is near to impossible to use this rubric for estimating
success. There is evidence, however, that in the area of securities litigation, the advent of the
PSLRA decreased the likelihood that a subset of meritorious non-nuisance cases would be
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It is also striking that a large percentage of the cases in the cohort involve
government defendants, as one might expect with such a high percentage of civil
rights and prisoners’ rights cases. Additionally, in some cases the settlements were
reflected in consent decrees, which is more suggestive of ultimate merit than an
average private settlement.156 Many observers view government defendants as
irrational with respect to settlement. In part this is because most government
defendants do not incur legal costs commensurate with the litigation activity in
which they engage.157 And in part this is because they are repeat players and view
settlement as sending a signal of weakness to other potential rent-seeking
plaintiffs.158 Finally, some commentators simply think government entities are
irrational.159
For those who view settlement with irrefutable skepticism, there may be little to
commend this study. Then again, it may be impossible to convince such individuals
that there is anything redeeming about our current civil justice system, regardless
of the pleading standard, given the central role occupied by pre-trial dispositions.
Nonetheless, even for those who believe that settlements are completely irrelevant
to underlying merit, these data provide other reasons to reconsider longstanding
assumptions about pleading. If one examines only the cases that litigated to
judgment, for instance, three resulted in verdicts for the plaintiff. In addition, three
other cases resulted in judgments for the plaintiff—one via a stipulated judgment
and two via an offer of judgment. Of the eleven cases in which judgment was
entered for the defendant after litigation, one involved a case in which the jury
awarded a significant verdict for the plaintiff, but the district judge granted a
judgment notwithstanding the verdict. Thus, even only considering cases that were
litigated to judgment, plaintiffs obtained success in a substantial percentage,
slightly more than one-third. Win rates at trial for all categories of cases have
hovered around 40% for the time period in question, although for specific
categories of cases, like employment discrimination cases, the win rate has
increased steadily, from about 27% in 1990 to 37% by 2000.160
The fact that plaintiffs are not as successful as or more successful than
defendants at trial is not necessarily an indication of weak cases. Because the most
difficult cases, in one direction or the other, are the cases most likely to litigate to
judgment, “the win rate [at trial] reveals something about the set of adjudged cases,

filed. See Choi et al., supra note 139, at 64–65.
156. The distinction between private settlements and court-enforced consent decrees was
recognized by the Supreme Court itself in Buckhannon Board & Care Home, Inc. v. West
Virginia Department of Health & Human Resources, 532 U.S. 598, 605 (2001), which
considered the latter, but not the former, to justify the award of attorneys’ fees to a plaintiff
as a “prevailing party” under 42 U.S.C. § 1988.
157. See, e.g., Joanna C. Schwartz, Myths and Mechanics of Deterrence: The Role of
Lawsuits in Law Enforcement Decisionmaking, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1023, 1032–33 & nn.43–
44 (2010) (summarizing literature regarding indemnification of law enforcement
defendants).
158. See, e.g., Schlanger, supra note 93, at 1619 (describing “no settlement” policies in
some prison systems).
159. See Daryl J. Levinson, Making Government Pay: Markets, Politics, and the
Allocation of Constitutional Costs, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 345, 370–71 (2000).
160. Clermont & Schwab, supra note 29, at 441 fig.7.
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a universe dominated by close cases—but reveals little about the underlying,
variegated mass of disputes and cases.”161 Clermont and Eisenberg have discussed
several factors that might lead to win rates that depart from an even fifty-fifty split:
different stakes between the parties, because of noneconomic or repeat player
factors; misperception of the biases of the adjudicating body, in which case a
below-50% win rate may reflect that the decision maker is not as plaintiff friendly
as the parties predict; and the average strength of the cases, which they suggest will
decrease as settlement and other disposition methods weed out the strongest
cases.162 In addition, the fact that the plaintiff bears the burden of proof, even if by
only a preponderance, could explain a below-50% success rate at trial.
These observations all relate to the data considered standing on their own, and
not in comparison with measures of success observed in other datasets or reported
by other researchers. Even some of the most experienced empiricists have
emphasized that achieving an estimate of case outcomes that reflects “real” wins
and losses can be difficult: counting “formal” wins and losses may be misleading
because some formal losses may actually have achieved something worthwhile for
the plaintiff, and some formal wins may have been insufficient to justify the high
costs of litigation.163 By calculating and comparing such formal win and loss rates
over time, however, research can at least illuminate relative success.164 Thus, the
comparisons between the cohort and the Administrative Office data, as well as the
data produced by other researchers, help provide a comparative success rate for the
cohort that also undermines an apparent assumption upon which the Iqbal and
Twombly rules rest. This comparative approach avoids resolving the difficult
question of exactly how much weight to place on settlement versus formal
judgment in terms of its relation to the merits of a case.
B. Likely Effect of Iqbal as Indicated by Comparisons Between
Cohort and Administrative Office Data
When one turns to comparisons between the rates of success in the cohort cases
and rates of success reported elsewhere and observed in the Administrative Office
data, these thinly pleaded cases seem to do at least as well as the generality of
cases. As Table 12 shows, the cohort cases occupy a middle ground, somewhere in
the range of success reported in other datasets, depending on how one measures
success. If success were measured only by settlements and verdicts, the cohort
cases seem to have a higher degree of success than that reported in many other
datasets. One can only interpret this finding so far, especially with respect to the
data contained in the Administrative Office dataset. As Gillian Hadfield has shown
by conducting a detailed audit of the Administrative Office data, settlements can be
hidden in voluntary and other dismissals.165 This finding of Hadfield’s can be

161. Clermont & Eisenberg, supra note 99, at 138.
162. Id. at 138–40.
163. Id. at 128.
164. See id. (observing that despite the limitations of relying on formal outcomes, when
averaged and observed over several years, such measures can “tell the researcher quite a
bit”).
165. Hadfield, Civil Litigation, supra note 96, at 1309–11 & tbls. 9 & 11 (showing that
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confirmed by the thinly pleaded cohort: a number of cases that I determined to be
settlements by looking at the actual docket were coded by the Administrative
Office as voluntary or other dismissals.166 Thus, even if one limited the
Administrative Office data to only settlements and verdicts, the success rate is
probably larger than is reported simply according to the Administrative Office’s
coding.
In any event, this evidence is only compelling if it is related to a relevant
assumption. For those who believe that the vast majority of the cases that will be
dismissed under a heightened pleading scheme like that imposed by Iqbal and
Twombly are meritless or frivolous, the data reported here seem to contradict that
assertion. For those who believe that Iqbal and Twombly are simply better at
screening out meritless cases than notice pleading, these data are cause for
questioning. And for those who are willing to sacrifice a number of good cases in
order to reduce docket levels to something manageable for federal courts, the data
reported here at least provide some basis upon which to have the debate. That is, if
we are focused on docket management more than ensuring that meritorious actions
have an opportunity to blossom through litigation, we can at least debate how best
to reduce the docket and whether prematurely dismissing a high percentage of
cases that most people agree are important—civil rights and other public law
cases—is a satisfactory price to be paid. After all, if heightened pleading is no
better a filter for merit than randomly dismissing cases at the outset, then it is worth
considering other alternatives.167
C. Methodological Objections and Responses
It is worth discussing some of the methodological concerns that might be raised
about this study. First, one must address the potential for selection bias that is
present in this study at many levels. Obviously, the source of cases is one potential
cause of selection bias because I started with (1) appellate cases (2) between 1990
and 1999 that (3) relied on Conley to reverse district court decisions. The reason I
began with appellate cases has been explained above: in my view, it is a good,
though not ideal, way of getting at the cases that are most likely to be viewed
marginally sufficient by a judge who is interpreting Iqbal and Twombly broadly.
Because appellate reversals reflect instances of disagreement between the district
court (and perhaps a magistrate) and at least two appellate judges as to the
sufficiency of a complaint under notice pleading standards, these cases are most
likely to be vulnerable to dismissal under heightened pleading standards.
The period of study is subject to some concern; after all, many sage observers
have noted that even during this period of time some courts did not take Conley

25% of “other” dismissals were settlements and 53% of voluntary dismissals were
settlements).
166. Out of twenty-one cases that I recorded as a stipulated dismissal, I could determine
the way that the Administrative Office coded them in sixteen cases. Of those sixteen, three
were coded as voluntary dismissals, five were coded as “other” dismissals, six were coded as
settlements, and one was coded as a judgment (for the defendant!).
167. See, e.g., David Rosenberg & Steven Shavell, A Simple Proposal to Halve Litigation
Costs, 91 VA. L. REV. 1721, 1721 (2005).

2011]

THE COSTS OF HEIGHTENED PLEADING

167

seriously, at least for some kinds of cases.168 But at least for this cohort, the
appellate courts stuck to the liberal reading of Conley for all kinds of cases.169
Indeed, if courts were routinely applying heightened pleading standards pre-Iqbal
and Twombly, and if more detailed pleading were correlated with more meritorious
suits, then one would expect the success rates observed in the Administrative
Office data to be even higher. The Administrative Office data do not support such
an effect, although it is not clear that the data are coded with sufficient subtlety to
detect it.170
There could be a different problem with looking at the 1990 to 1999 time frame:
if the substantive legal regime changed in a significant way during this period, it
might affect success rates. One might imagine this to be the case in the cohort.
Substantive law certainly changed over the period of study: Title VII was amended
in 1991,171 the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act was passed in 1995,172 and
the Prison Litigation Reform Act was passed in 1996.173 And pleading law did not
formally change, but in 1993 the Supreme Court felt compelled to remind lower
courts of their obligations under Conley.174 But after conducting multiple
regression studies, time (as represented by year of termination175) does not appear
to be a factor that exerts a significant influence on the outcomes of these cases.176

168. See, e.g., Fairman, supra note 21, at 998–1011.
169. That is, one can feel fairly confident that the cases contained in the cohort were not
subjected to a heightened pleading standard because in every case dismissal was reversed
based upon reliance on Conley’s liberal standard.
170. In part, this is because the Administrative Office does not distinguish between
pleading dismissals and summary judgment dismissals. One would imagine that in a
heightened pleading world, pleading dismissals would be relatively higher than in a notice
pleading world, but the Administrative Office data do not admit that kind of analysis.
171. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. 102-166, 105 Stat. 412 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
172. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
173. Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Title VIII of Pub. L. 104-134, 110 Stat. 132166 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.).
174. See Leatherman v. Tarrant Cnty. Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507
U.S. 163 (1993).
175. Year of termination would appear to be a better indicator of time than year of filing.
After all, when parties or courts resolve cases, they are usually doing so with respect to the
current legal regime, or else because they are making a prediction about future legal
changes. Pauline T. Kim, Lower Court Discretion, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 383, 411 (2007)
(describing the effect of shifting Supreme Court policy on decisions to settle or litigate
cases).
176. Because of the small sample size when one divides the cases according to year of
termination, the study did not have tremendous power to detect statistically significant
differences. Nonetheless, I used the “logit” command in Stata to run multiple regressions
using the following independent variables: pro se status in the district court, case type
(descriptive), and time (using two different ways of measuring the time at which the case
was terminated). Success was the dependent variable. Regression analyses are on file with
the author, and all significance testing was conducted at the 0.10 level. Pro se status was
significantly negatively correlated with success for all case types, without regard to time of
termination. Only four time variables were significantly correlated with success: termination
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A different kind of selection bias could be present because of starting with
appellate cases. Presumably, there is a difference between plaintiffs who appeal the
dismissal of their complaint and plaintiffs who walk away without appeal. The
former group may be more motivated, which may correlate with success later on in
the case, at least as it is measured here. They may also have access to greater
resources. Defendants may be influenced by a particularly strong appellate opinion
that they will be unlikely to prevail at a later summary judgment stage. On the other
hand, the defendant clearly had sufficient resources and motivation in the cohort
cases to pursue and succeed in bringing a motion to dismiss, and the trial court at
least initially thought the cohort cases to be weak. That attitude may persist on
remand and influence the resolution of other motion practice. Moreover, a focus on
appealed cases may better distinguish between those thinly pleaded cases which
could not have been amended and those cases in which the pleadings were thin for
strategic reasons. One would expect that a plaintiff who could plead with more
specificity would choose to amend rather than go through a lengthy and costly
appellate process to reverse a lower court’s dismissal.
Some of these are difficult objections to take account of. Looking to prisoner
cases may go some way to offering assurances that the plaintiffs who appeal are not
sufficiently different from the acquiescing plaintiffs in outcome-determinative
ways. At least it can be said that the prisoner-plaintiffs who appeal are unlikely to
have greater material resources than the prisoner-plaintiffs who do not. They may
be more motivated, but prisoner litigation, with the great resistance to settling from
prison officials,177 may be one set of cases where the plaintiff’s level of motivation
is mostly irrelevant to the outcome of a case. Moreover, Kevin Clermont has
provided data that suggest that, in fact, there is very little selection effect observed
among those losing parties who choose to appeal and those who do not.178 Finally,
it should be remembered that such a small percentage of disputes are litigated in
general that it is likely that a plaintiff who files suit is already highly motivated to
proceed.179
There is another kind of selection bias at work here as well, which is that the
cases considered in the cohort have arguably advanced past a particular procedural
stage—the motion to dismiss—such that the success rate reported in the cohort is
already biased toward positive success rates. The validity of this objection depends
in large part on two other factors: (1) the percentage of cases dismissed at the
pleading stage in run of the mill cases, and (2) the percentages of cases settled
before issue is joined. Although the Administrative Office data cannot give us these
during the years 1994 and 2000, and termination after the years 1996 and 1997. The
association between those time variables and success was positive in every case, except for
termination during the year 1994, which was negatively correlated with success. Even after
controlling for circuit of origin, terminations after the years 1996 and 1997 were still
significant correlates, although origination of the case in the Seventh or Ninth Circuit also
explained some of the variance. Similarly, termination during the years 1994 and 2000
remained a significant correlate of success for all circuits, although origination in the
Seventh and Ninth Circuits was a significant confounder for termination in the year 2000.
None of the time variables was as closely tied to success as pro se status in the district court.
177. See supra notes 157–59 and accompanying text.
178. Clermont, supra note 16, at 1971–72.
179. Trubek et al., supra note 98, at 86–87.
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percentages with exact precision, a rough comparison suggests that more cases are
terminated at an early stage by settlement than by dismissal.180 Thus, this suggests
that the effect of this selection bias is negligible, or even, in fact, should lead us to
reduce our estimates of success in the control group as compared to the cohort.
CONCLUSION
All empirical data should be interpreted with caution. The data reported here are
no exception. Litigation is extremely complex, and any attempt to quantify
outcomes carries with it inherent risks, many of which have been discussed in this
paper. But at the very least, these data suggest avenues for further research. We
would benefit by having more inclusive cohorts and more precise comparison
groups. To the extent we can eliminate methodological flaws in case selection, we
should strive to do so.
But whatever flaws there may be in the methodology used here, the data force
us to confront the strength of different arguments for heightened pleading. In the
absence of empirical data, it is insufficient to continue to rest on the assumption
that heightened pleading can rid us of meritless cases without imposing any
significant costs. Indeed, the data here suggest that the costs imposed by heightened
pleading may be substantial and may not create the assumed benefits. In this sense,
a heightened pleading standard may function in the same way that randomized
dismissal would, amounting to a radical departure from pleading standards that few
would find satisfactory.181 Given the ongoing debate about pleading standards that
is taking place within the judiciary, the legislature, and the academy, the data
presented here must be taken into account as we move forward to resolve how wide
the path to civil litigation should be.

180. See infra Appendix Table 2.
181. But see Rosenberg & Shavell, supra note 167, at 1721 (proposing that, to address
discovery costs and docket overload, courts randomly dismiss half of filed complaints
seeking damages, but award double damages in cases that proceed).
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APPENDIX
Appendix Table 1. Cohort of Conley-Reversed Pleading Cases
ID182 Case Name
3
Gibbs v. Norman

20
22
24
27
31

46
68
76
77
78
79
85
87
99
101
102
106
107
108
109
110
114
116
118
122
123
128

Yamaguchi v. U.S. Dep’t of the
Air Force
Northington v. Jackson
In re Johannessen
Atchinson v. District of Columbia
Leatherman v. Tarrant Cnty.
Narcotics Intelligence and
Coordination Unit
Wyatt v. City of Boston
Harris v. City of New York
George Haug Co. v. Rolls Royce
Motor Cars, Inc.
Drake v. Delta Air Lines, Inc.
Rogers v. City of Troy, N.Y.
Chance v. Armstrong
Northrop v. Hoffman of
Simsbury, Inc.
Hamilton Chapter of Alpha Delta
Phi, Inc. v. Hamilton Coll.
Bernheim v. Litt
Lyons v. Legal Aid Soc’y
Gant v. Wallingford Bd. of Educ.
Staron v. McDonald’s Corp.
Simmons II v. Abruzzo
Glendora v. Cablevision Sys.
Corp.
Yusuf v. Vassar Coll.
Wachtler v. Cnty. of Herkimer
Cohen v. Koenig
Gagliardi v. Vill. of Pawling
Sheppard v. Beerman
Ferran v. Town of Nassau
In re Time Warner Inc. Sec. Litig.
In re Ames Dep’t Stores Inc.
Stock Litig.

Cite
Circuit
898 F.2d 153 6th Cir.
(1995 WL
411829)
109 F.3d 1475 9th Cir.

Year District
1990 E.D.
Mich.

Docket No.
89-70974

1997 D. Haw.

94-766

973 F.2d 1518
76 F.3d 347
73 F.3d 418
507 U.S. 163

10th Cir.
11th Cir.
D.C. Cir.
S. Ct.

1992
1996
1996
1993

91-352
94-1900
92-1862
89-842

35 F.3d 13
186 F.3d 243
148 F.3d 136

1st Cir.
2d Cir.
2d Cir.

1994 D. Ma.
1999 S.D.N.Y.
1998 S.D.N.Y.

93-12412
96-7565
96-3140

147 F.3d 169
148 F.3d 52
143 F.3d 698
134 F.3d 41

2d Cir.
2d Cir.
2d Cir.
2d Cir.

1998
1998
1998
1997

94-5944
94-1652
95-2010
96-97

128 F.3d 59

2d Cir.

1997 S.D.N.Y.

95-926

79 F.3d 318
68 F.3d 1512
69 F.3d 669
51 F.3d 353
49 F.3d 83
45 F.3d 36

2d Cir.
2d Cir.
2d Cir.
2d Cir.
2d Cir.
2d Cir.

1996
1995
1995
1995
1995
1995

S.D.N.Y.
S.D.N.Y.
D. Conn.
D. Conn.
S.D.N.Y.
S.D.N.Y.

94-5378
94-2502
94-1365
93-665
92-7615
93-8344

35 F.3d 709
35 F.3d 77
25 F.3d 1168
18 F.3d 188
18 F.3d 147
11 F.3d 21
9 F.3d 259
991 F.2d 953

2d Cir.
2d Cir.
2d Cir.
2d Cir.
2d Cir.
2d Cir.
2d Cir.
2d Cir.

1994
1994
1994
1994
1994
1993
1993
1993

S.D.N.Y.
N.D.N.Y.
S.D.N.Y.
S.D.N.Y.
E.D.N.Y.
N.D.N.Y.
S.D.N.Y.
D. Conn.

92-5462
91-1328
92-4463
90-7047
91-1349
91-1080
91-4081
90-27

182. This is a unique identifier associated with each case.

D. Co.
M.D. Fla.
D.D.C.
N.D. Tex.

E.D.N.Y.
N.D.N.Y.
D. Conn.
D. Conn.
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130
133
134
135
139
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204
214

Case Name
Dwares v. City of New York
Weiss v. Wittcoff
Platsky v. CIA
Santana v. Keane
Allen v. WestPoint-Pepperell,
Inc.
Ricciuti v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth.
Day v. Morgenthau
Menkowitz v. Pottstown Mem’l
Med. Ctr.
Foulk v. Donjon Marine Co.
Graves v. Lowery
Comet Enter. Ltd. v. Air-A-Plane
Corp.
Garrett v. Elko
Pilz v. FDIC
Commercial Energies, Inc. v.
United Airlines, Inc.
Jordan by Jordan v. Jackson
Mylan Labs., Inc. v. Matkari
Orga v. Williams
Robinson v. Ladd Furniture, Inc.
Martin Marietta Corp. v. Int’l
Telecomms. Satellite Org.
De Sole v. United States
Shuff v. Avior Shipping Inc.

217

Jones v. Am. Council on Educ.

221

Branton v. City of Dallas

242
260
265

Crowe v. Henry
In re Burzynski
Tel-Phonic Servs., Inc. v. TBS
Int’l, Inc.
Garrett v. Commonwealth Mortg.
Corp. of Am.
Cooper v. Sheriff, Lubbock Cnty.,
Tex.
Fitzpatrick v. City of Dearborn
Heights

140
148
157
159
161
180
181
182
191
192
194
196
197
200

273
276
288

290

Tolbert v. Ohio Dep’t of Transp.

171

Cite
985 F.2d 94
966 F.2d 109
953 F.2d 26
949 F.2d 584
945 F.2d 40

Circuit
2d Cir.
2d Cir.
2d Cir.
2d Cir.
2d Cir.

Year
1993
1992
1991
1991
1991

District
S.D.N.Y.
S.D.N.Y.
E.D.N.Y.
S.D.N.Y.
S.D.N.Y.

Docket No.
90-4435
91-1057
90-1915
90-6309
90-3841

941 F.2d 119
909 F.2d 75
154 F.3d 113

2d Cir.
2d Cir.
3d Cir.

1991 S.D.N.Y.
1990 S.D.N.Y.
1998 E.D. Pa.

90-2823
88-8788
97-2669

144 F.3d 252
117 F.3d 723
128 F.3d 855

3d Cir.
3d Cir.
4th Cir.

1998 D.N.J.
1997 M.D. Pa.
1997 E.D. Va.

95-323
95-1624
95-926

120 F.3d 261 4th Cir.
117 F.3d 1414 4th Cir.
25 F.3d 1038 4th Cir.

1997 W.D. Va. 95-494
1997 D. Md.
95-3808
1994 E.D. Va. 93-120

15 F.3d 333
7 F.3d 1130
996 F.2d 1211
995 F.2d 1064
991 F.2d 94

4th Cir.
4th Cir.
4th Cir.
4th Cir.
4th Cir.

1994
1993
1993
1993
1992

E.D. Va.
D. Md.
E.D. Va.
M.D.N.C.
D. Md.

93-66
90-1096
92-64
92-273
90-1840

947 F.2d 1169
200 F.3d 814,
1999 WL
1093537
196 F.3d 1258,
1999 WL
800238
166 F.3d 339,
1998 WL
912092
43 F.3d 198
989 F.2d 733
975 F.2d 1134

4th Cir.
5th Cir.

1991 D. Md.
1999 W.D. La.

89-1434
98-1388

5th Cir.

1999 M.D. La.

98-592

5th Cir.

1998 N.D. Tex. 97-245

5th Cir.
5th Cir.
5th Cir.

1995 W.D. La. 92-365
1993 S.D. Tex. 90-2075
1992 N.D. Tex. 88-2181

938 F.2d 591

5th Cir.

1991 S.D. Tex. 89-3006

929 F.2d 1078 5th Cir.

1991 N.D. Tex. 90-16

181 F.3d 100,
1999 WL
357756
172 F.3d 934

6th Cir.

1999 E.D.
Mich.

6th Cir.

1999 N.D. Ohio 97-7592

97-73020

172
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ID
299

Case Name
Fisher v. Roberts

Cite
125 F.3d 974

Circuit
6th Cir.

307

Monette v. Elec. Data Sys. Corp. 90 F.3d 1173

6th Cir.

318
326

Miller v. Currie
King v. Schotten

6th Cir.
6th Cir.

339

Mayer v. Mylod

355
363

Warren v. Soc’y Nat’l Bank
Riley v. Daniels

368
369
373

Scott v. City of Chicago
Smith v. Cash Store Mgmt., Inc.
Bernstein v. Bd. of Educ.

375

Payton v. Rush-Presbyterian-St.
Luke’s Med. Ctr.
Glover v. Amoco Oil Co.

380

381
385

392
396
404

Walker v. Wallace Auto Sales,
Inc.
Mack v. O'Leary

50 F.3d 373
28 F.3d 1213,
1994 WL
284538
988 F.2d 635
905 F.2d 975
894 F.2d 1336,
1990 WL 6961
195 F.3d 950
195 F.3d 325
191 F.3d 455,
1999 WL
594920
184 F.3d 623
165 F.3d 32,
1998 WL
796083
155 F.3d 927
151 F.3d 1033,
1998 WL
416151
141 F.3d 322
133 F.3d 1054
113 F.3d 645

407

Cook v. Winfrey
Duda v. Bd. of Educ.
Caremark, Inc. v. Coram
Healthcare Corp.
Lucien v. Peters

408
413
421
429

Sledd v. Lindsay
Antonelli v. Sheahan
Emery v. Am. Gen. Fin., Inc.
Randolph v. McBride

432
433

Zarnes v. Rhodes
MCM Partners, Inc. v. AndrewsBartlett & Assocs., Inc.
Sherwin Manor Nursing Ctr., Inc. 37 F.3d 1216
v. McAuliffe

454

107 F.3d 873,
1997 WL
58812
102 F.3d 282
81 F.3d 1422
71 F.3d 1343
67 F.3d 301,
1995 WL
578185
64 F.3d 285
62 F.3d 967

6th Cir.

[Vol. 86:119
Year District
1997 E.D.
Mich.
1996 E.D.
Mich.
1995 N.D. Ohio
1994 N.D. Ohio

Docket No.
95-40475
94-60351
92-7456
93-1249

7th Cir.
7th Cir.
7th Cir.

1993 E.D.
Mich.
1990 N.D. Ohio
1990 E.D.
Mich.
1999 N.D. Ill.
1999 N.D. Ill.
1999 N.D. Ill.

98-3381
99-1726
97-6260

7th Cir.

1999 N.D. Ill.

97-5558

7th Cir.

1998 N.D. Ill.

96-3018

7th Cir.

1998 N.D. Ill.

96-5506

7th Cir.

1998 N.D. Ill.

94-621

7th Cir.
7th Cir.
7th Cir.

1998 N.D. Ill.
1998 N.D. Ill.
1997 N.D. Ill.

97-322
96-8481
95-5878

7th Cir.

1997 S.D. Ill.

94-130

7th Cir.
7th Cir.
7th Cir.
7th Cir.

1996
1996
1995
1995

91-1917
93-3955
94-5181
94-767

7th Cir.
7th Cir.

1995 C.D. Ill.
1995 N.D. Ill.

91-3344
92-5641

7th Cir.

1994 N.D. Ill.

92-6659

6th Cir.
6th Cir.

N.D. Ill.
N.D. Ill.
N.D. Ill.
N.D. Ind.

91-76512
87-3451
89-70518

2011]
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ID
462
469
471

Case Name
Jenkins v. Heintz
Randle v. Bentsen
Addams v. City of Chicago

474

Hi-Lite Prods. Co. v. Am. Home
Prods. Corp.
Casteel v. Pieschek
Mid Am. Title Co. v. Kirk
Hrubec v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger
Corp.
Early v. Bankers Life and Cas.
Co.
McKoy v. Brennan

475
484
486
499
500

525
538

539
546
560
564
565
570

571
574
577

582
583

588

Hugh Chalmers Motors, Inc. v.
Toyota Motor Sales
St. Cin v. Purkett

173

Cite
25 F.3d 536
19 F.3d 371
19 F.3d 1436,
1994 WL
64332
11 F.3d 1402

Circuit
7th Cir.
7th Cir.
7th Cir.

Year
1994
1994
1994

7th Cir.

1993 N.D. Ill.

92-384

3 F.3d 1050
991 F.2d 417
981 F.2d 962

7th Cir.
7th Cir.
7th Cir.

1993 S.D. Ind.
1993 N.D. Ill.
1992 N.D. Ill.

87-1311
86-2853
91-4447

959 F.2d 75

7th Cir.

1992 N.D. Ill.

90-6711

954 F.2d 726,
1992 WL
25364
184 F.3d 761

7th Cir.

1992 W.D. Wis. 90-622

8th Cir.

1999 E.D. Ark. 97-331

8th Cir.

1995 E.D. Mo.

8th Cir.
8th Cir.

1995 D.S.D.
93-4131
1994 E.D. Ark. 92-191

8th Cir.
9th Cir.

1992 W.D. Ark. 89-1141
1999 C.D. Cal. 97-451

9th Cir.

1999 D. Ariz.

96-683

9th Cir.

1998 C.D. Cal.

96-3792

9th Cir.

1997 D. Mont.

90-122

9th Cir.
9th Cir.

1997 C.D. Cal. 94-4382
1996 N.D. Cal. 92-20152

9th Cir.

1996 D. Or.

90-855

9th Cir.

1996 S.D. Cal.

93-1367

9th Cir.

1995 D. Haw.

93-255

68 F.3d 479
(1995 WL
603366)
Estate of Rosenberg v. Crandell 56 F.3d 35
Smith v. St. Bernard’s Reg’l Med. 19 F.3d 1254
Ctr.
Murphy v. Lancaster
960 F.2d 746
Big Bear Lodging Ass’n v. Snow 182 F.3d 1096
Summit, Inc.
AlliedSignal, Inc. v. City of
182 F.3d 692
Phoenix
Los Angeles Sheet Metal
139 F.3d 906
Workers’ Joint Apprenticeship
(1998 WL
Training Comm. v. Walter
51720)
Enron Oil Trading & Transp. Co. 132 F.3d 526
v. Walbrook Ins.
Gilligan v. Jamco Dev. Corp.
108 F.3d 246
Moore v. Gerstein
107 F.3d 16
(1996 WL
726649)
Walleri v. Fed. Home Loan Bank 83 F.3d 1575
of Seattle
Contreras v. United States
89 F.3d 844
(1996 WL
225768)
Jacobsen-Wayne v. Calvin C.M. 53 F.3d 338
Kam, M.D., Inc.
(1995 WL
234909)

District
N.D. Ill.
N.D. Ill.
N.D. Ill.

Docket No.
93-1332
91-5757
92-2893

94-673

174
ID
594
603
615

617
624
628

633
635
657

678

680
702
721
731
749
752
754
778
781
782
791
795
799
809

813
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Case Name
In re GlenFed, Inc. Sec. Litig.
Fobbs v. Holy Cross Health Sys.
Corp.
Plumes v. Quinlan

Cite
42 F.3d 1541
29 F.3d 1439

980 F.2d 738
(1992 WL
355504)
Chandler v. McMinnville School 978 F.2d 524
Dist.
Gila River Indian Cmty. v.
967 F.2d 1404
Waddell
Gonzalez v. Mesa Verde Country 951 F.2d 360
Club
(1991 WL
266541)
Pruitt v. Cheney
963 F.2d 1160
Datagate, Inc. v. Hewlett-Packard 941 F.2d 864
Co.
Corbin v. Runyon
188 F.3d 518
(1999 WL
590749)
Smith v. E.N.M. Med. Ctr.
72 F.3d 138
(1995 WL
749712)
Ramirez v. Okla. Dep’t of Mental 41 F.3d 584
Health
Olson v. Hart
965 F.2d 940
In re Edmonds
924 F.2d 176
Lopez v. First Union Nat’l Bank 129 F.3d 1186
Sofarelli v. Pinellas Cnty.
931 F.2d 718
Brown v. City of Fort Lauderdale 923 F.2d 1474
Executive 100, Inc. v. Martin
922 F.2d 1536
Cnty.
Maydak v. United States
1999 WL
1006593
Caribbean Broad. Sys., Ltd. v.
Cable & Wireless P.L.C.
Chandler v. D.C. Dep’t of Corr.
Maljack Prod., Inc. v. Motion
Picture Ass’n of Am.
Bonham v. D.C. Library Admin.
Okusami v. Psychiatric Inst. of
Wash.
Caribe BMW, Inc. v. Bayerische
Motoren Werke
Aktiengesellschaft
IUE AFL-CIO Pension Fund v.
Herrmann
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Circuit
9th Cir.
9th Cir.

Year District
Docket No.
1994 C.D. Cal. 91-344
1994 E.D. Cal. 89-682

9th Cir.

1992 C.D. Cal.

91-392

9th Cir.

1992 D. Or.

90-147

9th Cir.

1992 D. Ariz.

90-841

9th Cir.

1991 C.D. Cal.

89-6369

9th Cir.
9th Cir.

1991 C.D. Cal. 83-2035
1991 N.D. Cal. 86-20018

10th Cir. 1999 W.D.
Okla.

96-1766

10th Cir. 1995 D.N.M.

92-641

10th Cir. 1994 N.D.
Okla.
10th Cir. 1992 D. Kan.
10th Cir. 1991 D. Kan.
11th Cir. 1997 S.D. Fla.
11th Cir. 1991 M.D. Fla.
11th Cir. 1991 S.D. Fla.
11th Cir. 1991 S.D. Fla.

91-681
90-156
87-4196
95-2650
89-1311
87-6936
88-14188

D.C. Cir. 1999 D.D.C.

97-2199

148 F.3d 1080 D.C. Cir. 1998 D.D.C.

93-2050

145 F.3d 1355 D.C. Cir. 1998 D.D.C.
52 F.3d 373
D.C. Cir. 1995 D.D.C.

95-1735
90-1121

989 F.2d 1242 D.C. Cir. 1993 D.D.C.
959 F.2d 1062 D.C. Cir. 1992 D.D.C.

90-992
90-800

19 F.3d 745

1st Cir.

1994 D.P.R.

91-1156

9 F.3d 1049

2d Cir.

1993 D. Conn.

94-2134

2011]
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ID
814
820

Case Name
LaBounty v. Adler
Hayes v. Poe Homes Housing
Project Mgmt.

827
832

Walker v. Nat’l Recovery, Inc.
Bozickovich v. Harper

833
834

Bennett v. Schmidt
Moriarty v. Larry G. Lewis
Funeral Dir. Ltd.

Cite
933 F.2d 121
931 F.2d 886
(1991 WL
68813)
200 F.3d 500
165 F.3d 31
(1998 WL
767136)
153 F.3d 516
150 F.3d 773

175

Circuit
2d Cir.
4th Cir.

Year District
1991 S.D.N.Y.
1991 D. Md.

Docket No.
89-4242
90-1237

7th Cir.
7th Cir.

1999 N.D. Ill.
1998 N.D. Ill.

98-4530
97-5138

7th Cir.
7th Cir.

1998 N.D. Ill.
1998 N.D. Ill.

96-6914
96-6973

176
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Appendix Table 2. Cohort, by Circuit, Case Type, Success, Outcome, Pro Se
Status, Administrative Office Code, and Year Terminated
ID
3
20
22
24
27

Circuit
6th
9th
10th
11th
D.C.

31

S. Ct.

46
68
76
77

1st
2d
2d
2d

78
79
85
87
99

2d
2d
2d
2d
2d

101
102

2d
2d

106
107
108

2d
2d
2d

109

2d

110

2d

114
116

2d
2d

118
122

2d
2d

123
128
130

2d
2d
2d

133
134

2d
2d

Type
Prison
Emp Discrim
Prison
Other
Nonprison
civ rights
Nonprison
civ rights
Emp Discrim
Emp Discrim
Antitrust
Nonprison
civ rights
Emp Discrim
Prison
Consumer
Antitrust
Nonprison
civ rights
Emp Discrim
Nonprison
civ rights
Emp Discrim
Prison
Nonprison
civ rights
Nonprison
civ rights
Nonprison
civ rights
Tort
Nonprison
civ rights
Prison
Nonprison
civ rights
Sec Fraud
Sec Fraud
Nonprison
civ rights
Sec Fraud
Nonprison
civ rights

Success
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

Outcome
SJforDef
Settled
PlffVerdict
Settled
Settled

Pro Se
Yes
No
No
No
No

AOCode
550
442
550
422
360

Yr Termed
1995
1998
1995
1996
1999

No

SJforDef

No

440

1993

No
Yes
Yes
No

DefVerdict
Settled
Settled
Other

Yes
No
No
No

190
442
410
440

1997
2000
2000
2005

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

Settled
StipDism
PlffVerdict
StipDism
StipDism

No
Yes
No
No
No

710
550
360
410
440

2000
2000
2001
2000
1998

Yes
No

StipDism
SJforDef

No
No

442
440

1997
1998

Yes
No
No

StipDism
Dismissal
Dismissal

No
Yes
Yes

440
550
440

1996
1996
1999

Yes

StipDism

No

440

1998

No

DefVerdict

Yes

440

1995

No
Yes

DefVerdict
StipDism

No
No

370
440

1996
1995

No
No

SJforDef
SJforDef

Yes
Yes

440
440

2002
2002

Yes
Yes
Yes

Settled
Settled
Settled

No
No
No

850
850
440

1994
1993
1995

Yes
No

StipDism
Dismissal

No
Yes

370
890

1992
1994

2011]
ID
135
139
140

Circuit
2d
2d
2d

148

2d

157
159
161
180
181
182
191

3d
3d
3d
4th
4th
4th
4th

192

4th

194
196

4th
4th

197
200
204
214
217
221

4th
4th
4th
5th
5th
5th

242
260
265
273
276
288

5th
5th
5th
5th
5th
6th

290

6th

299
307
318
326
339
355
363
368
369
373

6th
6th
6th
6th
6th
6th
6th
7th
7th
7th

THE COSTS OF HEIGHTENED PLEADING
Type
Prison
contract
Nonprison
civ rights
Nonprison
civ rights
Emp Discrim
Other
Emp Discrim
contract
Prison
Tort
Nonprison
civ rights
Nonprison
civ rights
RICO
Nonprison
civ rights
contract
contract
Other
Other
Emp Discrim
Nonprison
civ rights
RICO
Tort
RICO
contract
Prison
Nonprison
civ rights
Nonprison
civ rights
Tort
Emp Discrim
Tort
Prison
Sec Fraud
ERISA
Prison
Emp Discrim
Consumer
Emp Discrim

177

Success
No
No
No

Outcome
SJforDef
Other
DefVerdict

Pro Se
Yes
No
No

AOCode
550
791
440

Yr Termed
1996
2001
1999

No

Dismissal

Yes

440

1992

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
No

Settled
Settled
Settled
Settled
SJforDef
Settled
SJforDef

No
No
No
No
No
No
No

440
120
440
190
550
360
440

2000
1998
2000
1998
1998
1997
1995

Yes

StipDism

No

440

1994

Yes
No

Settled
DefVerdict

No
No

470
440

1995
1994

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No

StipDism
Settled
StipDism
Settled
StipDism
DefVerdict

No
No
No
No
No
No

190
190
890
340
440
442

1995
1993
1992
2002
1999
2003

Yes
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes

Settled
StipDism
Dismissal
Settled
DefVerdict
Settled

No
No
No
No
Yes
No

470
470
890
140
550
440

1998
1997
1995
1993
1991
2005

Yes

Settled

No

443

2002

No
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes

DefVerdict
SJforDef
SJforDef
SJforDef
Other
Settled
SJforDef
Settled
Dismissal
Settled

No
No
Yes
Yes
No
No
Yes
No
No
No

360
790
360
550
850
890
550
442
890
442

1998
1997
1995
1996
1993
1992
1991
2000
2000
2001

178
ID
375

Circuit
7th

380
381
385
392
396
404
407
408

7th
7th
7th
7th
7th
7th
7th
7th

413
421
429
432
433
454

7th
7th
7th
7th
7th
7th

462
469
471
474
475
484
486
499
500
525
538
539
546
560

7th
7th
7th
7th
7th
7th
7th
7th
7th
8th
8th
8th
8th
8th

564
565
570
571
574

9th
9th
9th
9th
9th

577

9th

582
583
588
594
603

9th
9th
9th
9th
9th
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Type
Nonprison
civ rights
Tort
Consumer
Prison
Tort
Emp Discrim
Sec Fraud
Prison
Nonprison
civ rights
Prison
RICO
Prison
Prison
Antitrust
Nonprison
civ rights
Consumer
Emp Discrim
Emp Discrim
contract
Prison
Other
Other
Emp Discrim
Prison
Antitrust
Prison
Prison
Emp Discrim
Nonprison
civ rights
Antitrust
Tort
Tort
Other
Nonprison
civ rights
Nonprison
civ rights
Other
Tort
Tort
Sec Fraud
Emp Discrim
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Success
No

Outcome
DefVerdict

Pro Se
No

AOCode
440

Yr Termed
2000

No
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

Dismissal
Other
SJforDef
Settled
Settled
Settled
Settled
Settled

Yes
No
Yes
No
No
No
Yes
No

550
371
550
320
442
190
550
440

1999
1999
1999
1998
1998
1997
1998
1998

No
No
No
No
Yes
Yes

Yes
No
Yes
No
No
No

550
470
550
550
470
440

1998
1997
1996
1996
1997
1997

No
No
No
Yes
No
No
No
No
No
No
Yes
No
No
No

Dismissal
Dismissal
SJforDef
SJforDef
Settled
offer of
judgment
SJforDef
SJforDef
SJforDef
PlffVerdict
SJforDef
SJforDef
Dismissal
SJforDef
SJforDef
SJforDef
Settled
SJforDef
SJforDef
Dismissal

No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
Yes
No
No
No
Yes
Yes

890
895
442
190
550
820
890
442
550
410
550
440
442
440

1996
1994
1995
1996
1996
1994
1994
1994
1992
2000
1997
1997
1994
1993

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

Settled
StipDism
StipDism
Settled
Settled

No
No
No
No
No

410
245
791
110
443

2001
2000
1998
2002
1997

Yes

Settled

Yes

440

1997

Yes
No
No
Yes
Yes

Settled
DefVerdict
SJforDef
Settled
StipDism

No
No
No
No
No

360
360
362
850
440

1997
1997
1996
2001
1995

2011]
ID
615
617

Circuit
9th
9th

624
628
633

9th
9th
9th

635
657
678

9th
10th
10th

680

10th

702

10th

721
731
749

10th
11th
11th

752
754

11th
11th

778
781
782
791
795

D.C.
D.C.
D.C.
D.C.
D.C.

799
809
813
814
820

D.C.
1st
2d
2d
4th

827
832
833
834

7th
7th
7th
7th
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Type
Prison
Nonprison
civ rights
Other
ERISA
Nonprison
civ rights
Antitrust
Emp Discrim
Nonprison
civ rights
Nonprison
civ rights
Nonprison
civ rights
Other
Other
Nonprison
civ rights
Emp Discrim
Nonprison
civ rights
Prison
Antitrust
Prison
contract
Nonprison
civ rights
Tort
Antitrust
ERISA
Prison
Nonprison
civ rights
Consumer
Tort
Emp Discrim
Other

179

Success
No
Yes

Outcome
SJforDef
StipDism

Pro Se
Yes
No

AOCode
550
440

Yr Termed
1994
1993

No
Yes
Yes

SJforDef
Settled
Settled

No
No
No

950
791
440

1994
1992
1995

Yes
Yes
Yes

Settled
Settled
Settled

No
No
No

410
442
190

1996
2000
2001

Yes

Settled

No

442

1995

No

DefVerdict

Yes

950

1992

Yes
No
Yes

Settled
SJforDef
Settled

No
No
No

422
430
443

1998
1992

No
No

SJforDef
SJforDef

Yes
No

442
440

1999
1993

No
Yes
Yes
Yes
No

SJforDef
StipDism
StipDism
StipDism
SJforDef

Yes
No
No
No
Yes

895
410
550
840
440

2007
1999
2000
2001
1995

No
Yes
Yes
No
No

SJforDef
Settled
Settled
SJforDef
Dismissal

No
No
No
Yes
Yes

890
410
791
550
443

1995
1994
1996
2000
2002

Yes
Yes
Yes
No

Settled
StipDism
Settled
SJforDef

No
No
No
No

890
360
440
720

2000
1999
2000
2001

180
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Appendix Table 5. Cohort by Discovery Post-Remand and Success
Outcome
Discovery on
remand
No discovery on
remand
Total

Successful (%)
41 (47.1%)

Unsuccessful (%)
46 (52.9%)

Total (%)
87 (73.7%)

21 (67.7%)

10 (32.3%)

31 (26.3%)

62 (52.5%)

56 (47.5%)

118

Appendix Table 6. Cohort Outcomes by Year of Resolution
Year Filed
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
NA
Total

Successful
0
5
5
3
7
6
10
11
5
13
6
3
0
0
1
0
0
1
76

Unsuccessful
2
3
3
9
8
9
5
5
5
3
3
3
1
0
1
0
1
0
61

Total
2
8
8
12
15
15
15
16
10
16
9
6
1
0
2
0
1
1
137

